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I. INTRODUCTION

Can one put a price on the priceless? The practical answer must
be yes since taxpayers are required according to our transfer pricing
rules to price (or assign value to) intangibles they transfer to related
parties. The thriving valuation industry that focuses on intangibles
clearly indicates a belief that this is the case. 3 In fact, many countries,
including essentially all of the major economies, adopted transfer
pricing legislation similar to that of the United States.' Compliance
with these rules relies heavily on accurate valuation of the transferred
intangibles. This article evaluates to what extent this practice of
valuation is accurate, and whether it can support this widespread
confidence. In light of this evaluation, the article assesses the
desirability of our current transfer pricing regime.
Transfer prices are prices required to be reported in related-party
transactions for tax purposes Transacting taxpayers are required to
establish their transfer prices whenever they transact with related
parties, even if they have no other (e.g., business) reasons for such
(internal) pricing. As
rule, transfer prices should be based on the
S • a
6
arm's length principle, in which the transacting related parties are
taxed similarly to the manner in which they would have been taxed if
they were unrelated parties engaged in similar transactions charging
1 A price on the priceless,THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 1999, at 61.
2 See I.R.C. §482; Treas. Reg. §1.482-4 (2006).
3 The leaders are the big four accounting firms, yet a large number of

independent service providers emerged over the last years. See, e.g.,
http://www.transferpricingconsortium.com/TPChome.html;
http://www.valuationresearch.com/content/Services/TransferPricing.htm;
http://www.precisionecon.com/?gclid=CJjJu-DRJECFQpTHgodPyEr3Q;
http://appraisaleconomics.com/transfer.html. These are simply the first five Google
search results. Another good indicator is the constant search for transfer pricing
experts by executive head hunter services.
4 See, e.g., MARC M. LEVEY & STEVEN C. WRAPPE, TRANSFER PRICING: RULES,
COMPLIANCE AND CONTROVERSY
5 See I.R.C. §482.

180 (2d ed. 2008).

Even when the actual rules deviate from this principle, the government has
insisted on keeping the rhetoric of adherence to the arm's length principle. We shall
come back to this particularly in Part IV.A infra. Note that similar valuation exercises
may be required for customs purposes. This article does not discuss the interaction
between these two regimes for simplification.
6

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 28:79

arm's length (market) prices.7 The current international transfer
pricing regime is based on, and essentially follows, this principle. s
Our transfer pricing rules include specific rules for transfers of
intangibles that are separate and distinct from the rules that apply to
transfers of other types of assets. 9 This article focuses on these rules,
discussing the theory and practice of valuation of intangibles for
transfer pricing purposes in order to address the actual incentives
created by the current regime.' ° In particular, the article wishes to
expose the true nature of the valuation process, and determine what
the process can and cannot help us with. In the case of intangibles, the
reality is that the level of valuation inaccuracy is significant, yet the
rules do not account for such inaccuracy. Valuation and measurement
tools that aim at reducing uncertainties" are utilized as if they are
designed to produce a "fact" - a precise dollar amount presented as a
"price ''12 - and treated as such for tax purposes as if they were
market prices.13
In order to soberly evaluate the current regime, one must first
understand the general environment in which transfer pricing rules
operate. The basis for these rules is in the observation that society
requires taxation (revenue) so it can tl~rive beyond subsistence, yet
taxation is economically inefficient and wasteful. 1 The administration

7
8

Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b) (2006).
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in

the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation. (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Olin
Working Paper No. 07-017, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017524; see
also ERNST & YOUNG, 2007-2008 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY: GLOBAL
TRANSFER
PRICING
TRENDS,
PRACTICES
AND
ANALYSES,
available at
http://www.ey.com/Global/assets.nsf/InternationaU/EY-Tax -TPSurvey-2007/$file/Tax
_TPSurvey_2007.pdf [hereinafter "ERNST & YOUNG, 2007-2008 GLOBAL TRANSFER
PRICING SURVEY"].
9 See I.R.C. §482;

Treas. Reg. §1.482-4 (2006).
10 This is a global regime, and part of the international tax regime,
yet, for most
purposes this article focuses on the aspects of the U.S. transfer pricing regime.

11DOUGLAS W.

HUBBARD,How TO MEASURE ANYTHING: FINDING THE
VALUE

OF "INTANGIBLES" IN BUSINESS 10-27 (2007).

This is not actually so. See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, A New Method to
Value
Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353 (2002).
13 At the end of the day, every taxpayer reports her income
as one or more
distinct dollar amounts to which she applies an appropriate tax rate, and the product
of this straightforward multiplication is a single dollar amount owed to or due from
the government.
14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE
& PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 303 (3rd ed., 1980).
12
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of taxes adds to the waste, 5 and the transfer pricing rules serve as a
good example of this, since these rules mandate Multinational

Enterprises

(MNEs)

to

produce

extensive

documentation to support their transfer prices.

contemporaneous
16

This mandate

requires MNEs to bear significant costs for the employment of
specialists in the legal, economic and valuation fields.' 7 The basic idea
behind the system is to pass the burden to taxpayers when the

administration cannot make sense of or handle the burden of
enforcing the rules. In practice it develops into a stamina test that a
taxpayer can pass if she produces enough paperwork that looks

relevant. The waste that our transfer pricing rules represent is
considered necessary, since without such rules, MNEs could
essentially escape taxation, and countries could find themselves in

fierce and impossible competition for revenue.18

An arm's length based transfer pricing regime, such as ours,
permits relatively peaceful division of revenues between countries.'9
Peaceful, however, does not mean efficient or fair division of revenue.
On one hand, MNEs are encumbered with compliance costs that other

taxpayers do not bear; on the other hand they benefit from the
flexibility that these rules allow. Flexibility means lower effective tax
rates overall for such MNEs. Consequently, our tax regime creates an
incentive to invest abroad and particularly to invest extensively in
intangibles to capture as much of the benefits embedded in the
transfer pricing rules.
15

The source of this waste is enforcement and compliance costs. See, e.g., id. at

302-303.
6 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (2006); ERNST &
YOUNG, 2005-2006 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEYS: TAX
AUTHORITY INTERVIEWS: PERSPECTIVES, INTERPRETATIONS and
REGULATORY CHANGES, available at http://www.ey.com/global/assets.nsfl
International/TaxGlobalTransferPricingSurvey.Part3/$filelEYGlobalTPSurvey
3_Sep2006.pdf [hereinafter "ERNST & YOUNG, 2005-2006 GLOBAL TRANSFER
PRICING SURVEYS"].
17 See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, 2007-2008 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY,
supra note 8.
18 Note that related party transactions, or intra-firm trade, to which
transfer
pricing rules apply, is very significant, it increases and promises to be even more
important, particularly for the United States in the future. See, e.g., Tanweer Akram,
Haider Ali Khan & James Holladay, U.S. Intra-Firm International Trade (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030388.
19 There
is consensus because those countries that examined alternative
frameworks were forced back into the arm's length based consensus. The classic
example is that of Mexico. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 Tax L. Rev.
167,170 (1999).
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International tax competition may negate the benefits of domestic
transfer pricing rules or enhance their biases. In reality, the effect of
this competition is somewhat restrained by the international transfer
pricing regime, which is an important part of our international tax
regime that dictate some basic rules for this competition game.2O
Nonetheless, since the international tax regime is not based on close
cooperation between countries, 2' such restraint is not significant.
Despite the inherent multilateral flavor of transfer pricing law, the
main function of which is division of revenue between countries, there
is little international policy and administration coordination of
transfer pricing.
This article demonstrates that part of the blame is on the arm's
length standard. This article proposes that a formula based transfer
pricing regime is superior to the current regime on several grounds.
For example, it is more effective in general, particularly in the context
of intangibles, and it is more accommodating of international
coordination and cooperation. It better reflects the very basic
principles on which our general international tax regime is based on,
thus it is more compatible with the rest of our tax system.
The article proceeds as follows: Part II sets the stage for the
analysis explaining the unique features of intangibles that makes
intangibles difficult to value. Next, the intimate relationship of
intangibles and MNEs is elaborated on in light of the unique
characteristics of intangibles in order to explain the importance of
valuation of intangibles in the context of transfer pricing.
Part III applies traditional and novel theoretical approaches to
the art of valuation of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes. It
demonstrates the divorce between our actual scope-limited transfer
pricing rules and the richness and sophistication of modern valuation
theory. This section exposes the inadequacy of the arm's length
principle in the current market place.
This theoretical analysis is followed by a review and assessment of
the practice of transfer pricing in Part IV. The current U.S. rules and
their use in practice are reviewed first. Then, the article reviews the
main cases where the courts attempted to apply these rules. This
review demonstrates the difficulty of applying the transfer pricing

20 Id. at 169 (arguing that the network of bilateral tax treaties "constitutes
an

international tax regime, which has definable principles that underlie it and are
common to the treaties").
21 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization,
56
Tax L. Rev. 259 (2003).
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rules and the frustration of the courts with this difficulty, which has
resulted in the court's use of alternative solutions to resolve the
disputes in front of them.
The article concludes, in Part V, with a reassessment of the
current arm's length based transfer pricing system and a
demonstration of how a formulary system based on international
coordination is superior to the current system from the perspective of
valuation of intangibles. Extension of this conclusion to a systemwide
assessment requires further study, yet since the valuation of
intangibles is probably the biggest challenge to contemporary transfer
pricing at the present, the outcome of this article should represent a
significant step towards reform."
II. INTANGIBLES ARE DIFFERENT AND IMPORTANT

Taxpayers are uncomfortable with the requirement that they
establish transfer prices for their intangibles. In many cases, the
valuation of these intangibles does not seem natural to
businesspersons, and they do not engage in such valuations for
purposes other than the pathology of the law (i.e., taxes, bankruptcy,
or other regulatory purposes). 23 Their lawyers are even more nervous,
and develop an attitude toward this practice that is cynical at best. The
reason for this negative attitude is the inherent complexity of the
issues and analyses involved and the general uneasiness that lawyers
have with uncertainty, especially when uncertainty dominates the
"facts" (the value of intangibles in our case).
An understanding of intangibles is an essential first step in
explaining the reasons for this complexity and uncertainty. First, this
section clarifies the necessity of special transfer pricing rules for
intangibles, and the centrality of valuation to such rules. The
uniqueness of intangibles is explored next. The article emphasizes the
features that make intangibles difficult to valuate (and different from
tangible property for these purposes). Highlighting the distinctive
features of the different types of intangibles demonstrates the
difficulty of using a unitary approach to value all intangibles. These
22

Despite the intimate relationship between the cost sharing rules, see Treas.

Reg. §1.482-7 (2006), and transfer pricing for intangibles, I chose not to include cost
sharing in this article, since I observe several additional issues that one must tackle in
the context of cost sharing that are irrelevant to this article. Their assessment must
wait for future study.
Measurement is another story, yet it is very different from pricing. See
Hubbard, supra note 11.
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differences are explored, and later analyzed, in order to determine
whether different valuation approaches may be warranted for
different intangibles.
Finally, this section elaborates on the intimate relationship
between intangibles and MNEs, to demonstrate both the importance
and significance of intangibles to international trade, which in turn,
requires their valuation for transfer pricing purposes. This analysis
also adds to the specific features that distinguish transactions in
intangibles in the context of transfer pricing (being exchanged by
MNEs) from transactions in other assets.
A. Why Transfer Pricingfor Intangibles
Transfer pricing rules are a necessary component of any
international income tax law since these rules stop MNEs from easily
avoiding or significantly reducing taxation by shifting profits to low or
no tax jurisdictions. Since intangibles are important to the operation
and existence of MNEs, and since MNEs are major players in a
majority of the cross-border intangible transactions, transfer pricing
rules naturally apply largely to transactions that involve transfers of
intangibles in one way or the other.
To put it more concretely, a transfer pricing analysis is required in
any licensing agreement between related entities; in almost any
international restructuring of groups of companies; in many intragroup agreements that involve knowledge, research and development,
management, organizational or production and manufacturing
processes; and even in distribution agreements of tangible products
where the value of the product depends on embedded intangibles
(e.g., proprietary software).
The following subsection further elaborates on the nonunitary
nature of intangibles and the difficulty of applying a unitary approach
to all such assets. Despite this difficulty, current law attempts to do
just that by applying a single standard to all related party transactions
in intangibles. 24 Moreover, our rules reflect an essentially universal
consensus and convergence of transfer pricing norms.2' This
convergence has positive consequences that will be explored later in
this article; however, the price of such convergence is the lack of finely
24 The singular approach is qualified, mainly through elaborate
regulations.

Nevertheless, despite the diversity of approaches permitted by the regulations there is
no recognition of the differences between intangibles and the consequent potential
necessity of different approaches to their valuation.
See supra note 19.
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tuned norms that could respond to the unique features of the specific
intangible assets transacted. Criticism of this rudimentary approach is
a major theme of this article. Not only is it a problematic singular
approach applied to all transactions, but the approach that has been
adopted is particularly incompatible with transactions involving
intangibles. This approach is problematic because the universal
transfer pricing norm applies the arm's length standard to all
transactions. 6 This approach to transfer pricing depends on markets
and market prices to serve as benchmarks for the establishment of
"transfer prices." This "make believe" approach inherently requires
the use of proxies and adjustments that depend on valuation
techniques, which are required in every step that one threads.
Next, we explore the unique features of intangibles in more detail.
Understanding them will allow us to assess the strength of potential
valuation practices, and to evaluate the current transfer pricing rules
applying to transactions in intangibles.
B. The Uniqueness of Intangibles

1. Why Are Intangibles Difficult to Valuate?
Intangibles are all the nonphysical, nonmonetary assets of a firm."
This general definition, however, is not very informative for our
purposes. We need to explore various specific and unique
characteristics of intangibles to better understand the economics of
the transactions that involve them. We shall see also that intangibles
come in many forms and certain unique characteristics may be
important for transactions in some intangibles but not for others.
Legal protection is one key element in this analysis. The legal
framework for the protection of inventions as "intellectual property"
is a relatively recent phenomenon, 28 whereas intangibles have been
with us forever. The debates over the appropriateness of intellectual
property protection and the terminology itself are beyond the scope of
this article, yet it is easy to see how the special legal entitlements that
intellectual property laws create affect the value of the exchanged
media subject to the transfer pricing rules. The international
dimension complicates the picture even more because there are
26 See supra note
8.
27 GORDON

V.

SMITH

&

RUSSELL

L.

PARR,

INTELLECTUAL

VALUATION, EXPLOITATION, AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES

PROPERTY:

13 (2005).

28 Intellectual property is a type of intangible that does receive legal
protection.

The term "intellectual property" had not been used prior to the mid 19" century.
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inevitably at least two jurisdictions involved in any transfer pricing
case, and these jurisdictions may have different approaches to
intellectual property laws. It is even possible that the countries
involved protect the intellectual property rights of different parties or
provide different types of protection. The level of legal protection and
its duration clearly affect the value of intellectual property and
inherently affect the value of other assets whose value depends on the
value of intellectual property. We shall see later in this article that our
transfer pricing rules basically ignore this, as well as other possibly
relevant distinctions.
An important feature of many intangibles is that they have public
goods characteristics, since they are easily diffused. In many cases
the same intangibles are also easy (and cheap) to transfer." In other
cases, however, they may be impossible or very costly to transfer (or
at least lose significant value upon transfer). 1 In these cases, one may
reach very different valuations based on what one's approach is: for
the owner firm, the latter intangibles may be worth a lot and expected
to generate significant income, but for others it may have little value.
It is naturally very difficult to reflect this nuance in valuation.
Often, intangibles contribute to the firm, and hence gain value, by
interacting with other assets or products of the firm (or being
embedded in such assets or products). In this case, it is important to
understand the ability to separate the intangibles from these other
assets for the purpose of valuation. There are several approaches that
may lead to different valuations. An attempt to delineate the value of
the intangibles from the embedded tangible property may be easy and
reasonable in some, but not all, cases. The sale by a PC manufacturer
of a desktop PC with OEM software embedded, say, a word
processor, may be delineated quite simply if the software is also sold
separately on the market. On the other hand, for example, a complex
medical device that includes a piece of highly customized software
that may be close to useless with any other machinery presents a much
more difficult case of valuation. It might be difficult and quite
arbitrary to try and put a separate price tag on the hardware, software,
optic device and the various expertise sets involved.
A related feature of intangibles is that they often interact with
29 BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT
AND REPORTING

22 (2001).
30 Take, for example, the secret ingredients of Coca-Cola. Once publicly known,
the successful taste of the beverage could be easily and inexpensively replicated,
hurting the value of the formula to Coca-Cola.
31 Think about a management process or "chemistry" of a workforce.
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tangible and financial assets to create value.32 Therefore, even if the
intangible is not embedded into a tangible product, the intangible may
still create value that could not be captured by separately valuing the
participating assets, assuming such separation were possible.
The feasibility of separating the various assets valuated and
writing a contract that describes accurately the intangible (if one
wishes to sell or purchase it) are important as well. Cohesiveness of
the workforce or management, for instance, may be very valuable to a
firm, yet it is difficult to see how the firm can sell it. In addition to the
inability to write this into the contract, it may not be practically
separated from the owner firm or "transferable" (even if the entire
workforce remained in place, say, after an acquisition by a rival firm).
Some intangibles are transferable, but only at a high cost or
unpredictable chance of success. Such intangibles are, again, tricky to
valuate.
2. Primary Value Drivers and Value Detractors
Baruch Lev, a leading scholar in the field of the economics of and
accounting for intangibles, defines intangibles as "nonphysical sources
of value (claims to future benefits) generated by innovation
(discovery), unique organizational designs, or human resource
practices."33 The definition highlights three quite distinct groups of
intangibles categorized by the source of their value. Lev further
asserts that the two major drivers of benefits from intangibles are
nonrivalry and network effects, while partial excludability, inherent
risk, and nontradability are their primary value detractors.34 Next, I
elaborate on how these factors affect the value of intangibles.
Nonrivalry or scalability is the first attribute that one thinks about
when noting the uniqueness of intangibles, since many benefits from
intangibles have low or no opportunity costs.35 This is related to the
ease-of-transfer point mentioned above. For example, if corporation
X developed a software that improves its manufacturing process, it
would be possible to license it to corporation Y without reducing the
value of that software to X's own manufacturing process. If this were a
tangible asset rather than an idea - say, a special piece of equipment
- lending it to Y would necessarily mean that at the same time X
could not use it. In cost terms, intangibles often have certain (large)
32

LEV, supra note 29, at 12.

33 Id. at 24-49.
34

Id.

35 Id. at 29.
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sunk costs and low marginal costs - it does not cost a lot to duplicate
the piece of software or to upload it to a customer's server. Returns to
scale may be increasing rather than decreasing as is typical of tangible
property.36 This is the main reason for the enormous profit potential
from intangibles.37
A related feature is the flexibility of exploitation that
characterizes many intangibles that further increases the profit
potential of intangibles. A classic example is a piece of software: a
flight simulator, for example, could be transformed to a variety of
computer games; an inventory system may be reversed engineered
and transformed to a human resources system; and a broadcasting
solution may be transformed to online teaching platform. This is a
very prevalent practice in the world of software, albeit an extremely
simplified one. Assuming that these transformations are less costly
than writing new pieces of software, and, of course, rely on an already
existing "idea" for which somebody is willing to pay, they represent
another dimension of scalability that simply does not exist in the
tangible world. An old dining table may be used to craft, say, an
"entertainment center," but once transformed it is not a dining table
and the full cost of its production are wasted from the dining
perspective; this is not the case with reverse engineered software.
The network effect value driver is also related to scale.3" Potential
benefits from networks increase with the size of the network.
Naturally, these benefits will be larger if participants value the size of
the network. Most industries or markets where network effects are
significant rely considerably on intangibles. These are usually
technology and information based markets, where intangibles are
central.
The challenges of intangible-based enterprises are not negligible.
One value detractor is partial excludability (i.e., the inability of
owners of intangibles to defend spillovers, and enjoy the full benefits
of ownership themselves). 39 This feature could be viewed as the
"price" or the downside of scalability: intangibles may be easy and
cheap to duplicate and expand, yet they are similarly easy and cheap
36 Id. at 30-34 (referring inter alia to Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan
Helpman,
Innovation in the Theory of Growth, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 23, 31(1994) (arguing that
purposive, profit-seeking investments in knowledge play a critical role in the long-run
growth process, while reviewing models of endogenous technological progress and the
lessons they can teach us)).
37 Id. at 33-34.
38

39

Id. at 34-40.
Id. at 43-48.
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to copy. Even legally protected intangibles are costly to protect, never
really 100% safe, and their protection eventually expires. Partial
excludability creates significant pressure, and costs, on management
to protect the intangible and maximize its benefits, and adds to the
risk of investment in any development project. °
Increased risk is characteristic of intangibles in other ways. The
innovation process is acknowledged as inherently more risky than any
other thing done by a firm: one may, for instance, invest a lot of
resources to develop a drug and fail, or be beaten to a patent by a
competitor. Moreover, even once one has succeeded in developing
and patenting a drug, there is a risk that a competitor will develop a
more successful drug that will secure most of the value in the specific
market. 41 The main driver of the risk is the dependence on the "idea"
42
- what Lev calls the discovery - which has much more value than
any other part in the process (testing, commercialization, etc.). This
risk is a value detractor, but, of course, once secured, success is
enhanced (and competition potentially depressed), so it can be
translated into increased returns. 3
Finally, unique intangibles do not have markets and hence they
are considered nontradable. The lack of markets means lack of the
best contribution that markets provide: good information about the
traded assets. Also, markets reduce risks by allowing liquidity and
leverage (risk sharing) opportunities, both of which are very restricted
in the case of intangibles, and therefore increase the risks inherent to
these properties.44 Now, of course, not all intangibles suffer from these
risks similarly, and, of course, many intangibles are traded in reality,
yet all three of the above value detractors uniquely affect intangibles,
their values and, most importantly for our purposes, the ease and
reliability of their valuation.
A tangential, but very real difficulty is the crisis in the
field of
S 41
accounting with respect to financial reporting of intangibles. Many
intangibles are not recorded on the firm's balance sheet and therefore
40

Id.

41 See, e.g., id. at 48-50.
42

Id. at 51-54.

43 See, e.g., id. at
54.

See, e.g., id. at 55-56.
45 See, e.g., JOHN R. M. HAND AND BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLE
ASSETS: VALUES,

MEASURES AND RISKS 447-524 (2003); Leandro Cafiibano, Manuel Garcfa-Ayuso &

Paloma SAnchez, Accounting for Intangibles:A Literature Review, 19 J. Acc. LIT. 102
(2000); Douglas J. Skinner, Accounting for Intangibles - A Critical Review of Policy
Recommendations (December 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1080572.
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are not reflected in the book value of the firm, which further distorts
46
whatever the market response may be to them. It also encourages
inefficient behavior by management and investors in a firm that
operate based on incomplete and asymmetric information.
Next, I explore the importance of these unique and varying assets
in the relevant context for transfer pricing purposes: cross-border,
intra-group transactions.
C. Intangibles and MNEs
MNEs are unique as well. Their prominence in international trade
48
is unquestionable. Their success is particularly interesting since they
have to overcome some obvious basic hurdles such as the costs of

expanding operations across borders and the increased agency,

and
compliance costs of merely operating
monitoring, administrative,
•
•
49
in a multiple-country setting.
The theory of MNEs and their existence, despite these hurdles, is

that in highly uncertain conditions and when a certain investment is
very specific to a firm, opportunism is highly likely and therefore
internalization can be more efficient than market transactions. °
Internalization serves MNEs well when they go abroad, particularly in

their choice of the location of the investment and the mode of
operation." The MNE as a hierarchy can save on transaction costs and
46 LEV, supra note 29, at 55-56.
47 I do not discuss the effect on taxation, yet, since taxation always starts from

the financial information, the problematic standards exacerbate the distortion that
exists anyway in this context.
48 See, e.g.,
REPORT

1999:

U.N.
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FOREIGN

DIRECT

AND DEV.,

INVESTMENT

DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.3 (1999).
49 See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL
ANALYSIS

AND

WORLD

THE

ENTERPRISE

INVESTMENT

CHALLENGE

AND

OF

ECONOMIC

1-23 (2d ed. 1996).

50 This internalization explanation arose in the transaction cost economics

movement, not necessarily focused on MNEs. See, e.g.,

OLIVER

E.

WILLIAMSON,

(1975); Oliver
E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87
AM. J. SOC. 548 (1987); Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins,
Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981). The analysis was then extended to
the international context. See, e.g., D.J. Teece, Transactions Cost Economics and the
MultinationalEnterprise,7 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 21 (1986).
51 John H. Dunning, Trade Location of Economic Activity and the Multinational
Enterprise: A Search for an Eclectic Approach, in THE INTERNATIONAL ALLOCATION
MARKET AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
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government interventions (including taxes), and has the ability to
overcome or operate despite the inherent difficulty of development of
intangible markets. 52 MNEs survive and thrive because they are
hierarchical, which allows them to overcome market imperfections
such as the ones mentioned above by efficient internalization.
Intangibles are crucial in the course of maintaining and increasing
this advantage, which explains the centrality of intangibles for
successful MNEs.! We already mentioned that networks effects are
large in intangibles-heavy industries, and these are the same industries
where MNEs thrive. 4 One may argue that intangibles even determine
the boundaries of MNEs 5 Anyway, intangibles are central among the
necessary conditions for the successful operation of MNEs.56 The
research about MNEs, and the explanations of their existence have
significantly advanced in recent years. A consensus has not developed,
yet the internalization of costs emerges as a major, if not exclusive,
explanation of the MNE phenomenon. 7 Extension of this debate is
beyond the scope of this article, yet this academic research supports
the importance of intangibles, both in terms of substance and dollar
value for MNEs and the inherent risk and often unavailability of
markets for intangibles."
Intangibles are not just important;59 they generate significant
income for MNEs. Intangibles also generate significant benefits for
governments, and such governments struggle with MNEs and between
themselves over the taxing rights of the income generated by these
intangibles. 6° Transfer pricing is a key enforcement tool in the hand of
governments in our world of tax competition between countries;
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION 13 (1988). For a relevant discussion of Dunning's work
on MNEs, see MONICA Boos, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: THE VALUATION
OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 1.3 (2003).
52 See, e.g., LEV, supra note 29,
53 See, e.g., CAVES,

at 55-56.
supra note 49, at 162-188.

54 See id.
55

See Boos, supra note 51, at 30-31 nn.134-37.

56 This is particularly important to horizontally integrated MNEs. See CAVES,

supra note 49, at 4-5, 162.
57 See, e.g., id. at 1-23.
58 See, e.g., RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS

(3d ed. 2007);

JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE

GLOBAL ECONOMY (2d rev. ed. 2008).
59 See generally MICHELLE MARKHAM, THE TRANSFER PRICING OF INTANGIBLES

1-4 (2005).
60 Jane G. Gravelle & J. Taylor, Tax Neutrality and the Tax Treatment of
PurchasedIntangibles,45 NAT'L TAX J. 77, 81 (1992).
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however, the arm's length standard faces difficulty at the outset
because of its fictitious basis. This basis is the attempt to pretend that
we can extrapolate market prices when markets may not exist without
changes in economic circumstances, and when the mere existence and
business success of the taxpayers (MNEs) depends on these
circumstances of superiority of hierarchies over markets.
Note that the reality is not as homogenous as the above
explanation may imply. Not all intangibles are developed by MNEs
and there are markets for certain intangibles, including cross-border
arm's length transactions in intangibles. Nonetheless, these
transactions often occur because of circumstances under which the
MNEs involved expect higher profits from selling or licensing the
intangible than keeping the intangible inside the firm. This is the
classic situation that a MNE faces when it considers expansion into a
new market (i.e., country) while a market transaction alternative
exists in the form of, say, an interested local licensee.
The choice between licensing or new foreign investment may be
complicated and is affected by many considerations: the size of the
new market (if too small the risk may not be worth the benefit), the
difficulty and costs of licensing (a bad legal environment and lack of
trust or bad communication with the potential licensee can be fatal),
and timing (licensing may bring the product to market quickly, while
establishment of a new operation may take time that an MNE may
not have with certain products), among others. 6 ' Arm's length, crossborder licensing of intangibles of this kind, however, does not make
the valuation of intangibles easier because these market transactions
necessarily differ from the related party transactions even when
dealing with the exact same intangible. The differences arguably make
these two types of transactions noncomparable as evidenced by the
very decision of the MNE, who controls its own decision to license or
not, to go one way or the other. Current practice uses adjustments to
62
try and bridge this gap, but this is an awkward solution since it relies
itself on comparables that necessarily do not face the same differences
and because it diverts the control from the invisible hand of the
market to the experience reliability and other qualities of professional
valuators. Whatever one thinks about it, this is not just application of
the arm's length standard or a market approach.
Finally, taxes affect the decisions of MNEs, but I wish to
neutralize that fact for now, since taxation effects include the effect of
61

For a good review and analysis, see

62 See infra Part IV.A.

CAVES,

supra note 49, at 168-72.
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the application of the transfer pricing rules that we are trying to
evaluate here.
The next section elaborates on the valuation process itself in light
of the challenges discussed in this section to expose the margins of
error and accuracy range that we really deal with and which current
law basically ignores. This analysis will allow us at a minimum to
acknowledge the efficacy of our current law. 63 Later in the article, it
will help us assess it against alternatives.
III. TRANSFER PRICES AND THE VALUATION OF INTANGIBLES
Globalization and market sophistication brought about significant
advancement in the art of business valuation. This is particularly true
to the valuation of intangibles, which is a challenging exercise due to
the unique characteristics of intangibles that we have explored in the
former section. This section explores the application of general
valuation theory and practices to intangibles, maintaining a focus on
the context of transfer pricing. This focus is particularly important
because one crucial lesson about valuation is that it is a strongly
context-dependent practice. 64 Hence, this section first explains the
"valuation" doctrine embedded in our current transfer pricing laws,
namely the application of the arm's length standard. Subsequently, the
section examines the effectiveness of this doctrine through the lens of
the traditional valuation practice and investigates the usefulness of
such traditional (and some less traditional) valuation methods for the
establishment of transfer prices of intangibles.
I use the term "practice," rather than "science" for instance, since
a second important lesson about valuation is that it produces
estimations of value, 65 not value in the colloquial sense. This point is
63 Another aspect that adds to the complexity of an already quite complex
analysis is the fact that intangibles come in various and different forms. Some of them
have certain of the characteristic explored in this section and some have others; some
are easier to valuate in certain circumstances and some are very difficult. The degree
of accuracy (for lack of a better word) significantly varies from one case to another,
and accordingly the abuse and distortion potentials vary. A detailed inventory of the
various types of intangibles and their unique sets of features and value drivers is
beyond the scope of this article. Yet, throughout the analysis I demonstrate the
importance of this realization in order to further establish the claim that current law
deals with the valuation of intangibles poorly, and therefore does not attain its goals.
6' See WESTON ANSON & DONNA SUCHY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
VALUATION: A PRIMER FOR IDENTIFYING AND DETERMINING VALUE 30-31,138-42
(ABA, 2005); SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 256.
65 See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 140.
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critical for the purposes of this article because it emphasizes the
limitation of valuations that we, in the tax practice, oftentimes treat as
facts, ignoring or not fully noting their true nature.
A. The Arm's Length Standard

1. Background
The arm's length standard is the heart, spirit and the foundation
of the current international transfer pricing regime. The basic idea of
the arm's length standard is that transactions between related parties
should be priced as if such transactions were done between unrelated
parties and therefore subject to market pricing. The standard arose in
the United States in legislation attempting to deal with domestic
66
related party transaction in the early income tax days.
S 67 The standard
was enacted into law explicitly in a 1935 regulation, and remained
practically unchanged until 1968, when the first modern set of
regulations was promulgated. 68 Cross-border related party
transactions were few and did not concern the government until the
post-World War II era, which was characterized by expansion of
MNEs and cross-border related party transactions.
The government responded with the 1968 regulations, which
included specific rules for intangibles and services but only little
guidance about the practical application of the rules to these income
items. The arm's length standard requires the taxpayer to find
comparable market transactions between unrelated parties and
imitate their pricing in the related party transactions for tax purposes.
The transferor is viewed as if she charged the transferee a transfer
price similar to that charged in the comparable transaction, adjusted
to the level of difference between the related party and the
comparable unrelated party transactions. This is and has always been
the essence of the transfer pricing practice. Finding comparables was
key under the 1968 regulations, yet the regulations lacked guidance
regarding situations where comparables were absent or unsatisfactory.
Not surprisingly, MNEs continued to thrive and exploit the weak
enforcement of these rules.69
6 War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917). For an historical review,

see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the
Evolution of U.S. InternationalTaxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89 (1995).
67 Art. 45-1 of Reg. 86 (1935) (Revenue Act of
1934).
T.D. 6952,1968-1 C.B. 218.
The tax incentives permitted for investment in Puerto Rico became
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Congress responded this time with the only substantive
amendment to section 482 to date, adding to the arm's length standard
a "commensurate with income" requirement applicable to payments
for the use of intangibles. 70 This meant that taxpayers could not focus
on a one-time battle over an established transfer price and were
required to make periodic adjustments, even to an (initially)
appropriate transfer price where future income proved insufficient or
excessive. Congress further instructed Treasury to study the issue and
provide application guidance for the new commensurate with income
requirement. The "white paper" of 1988 resulted from this study,7 1 yet
the study drew significant critique and it took two rounds of proposed
regulations until new regulations were eventually finalized in 1994.72
The 1994 regulations attempted to address the shortcomings of
prior regulations. They acknowledged that exact comparables do not
always exist and filled the gap by the establishment of the concept of
arm's length range.73 Practically, taxpayers had to establish this range
from all reasonable (rather than exact) comparables, and then choose
a transfer price effectively from the 25%-75% inter-quartile range.
Failing to do that opened the door for the Service to intervene and
pick the mean result. In addition, the 1994 regulations installed the
"best method rule," 74 which established that there was no
predetermined hierarchy between the available methods yet required
the taxpayer to defend the transfer pricing method used based on
level of comparability and the data available. 75 The commensurate
with income requirement was relaxed somewhat as the Service
created safe harbors from its application when certain methods and
guidance were used. The requirement had little "bite" and therefore
little relevance.
The arm's length standard dictates, first and foremost, a market
approach to transfer pricing. Taxpayers are required for tax purposes
to put a fictional price on their nonmarket transactions. This "transfer
price" must be established based on other market transactions. An
adjustment to such comparable market prices may be made to account
for the nonidentity of the analyzed market and nonmarket
particularly popular among tax planners for these purposes. See, e.g., cases cited infra
Part IV.B.
70 Tax Reform Act of 1986.
71 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
72 T.D. 8552, 1994-2 C.B.
93.
73 Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(e) (2006).
74 Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(c) (2006).
75 The article elaborates on the methods in infra Part IV.A.3.
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transactions, yet a price produced by a market must be the basis for
the analysis. Similarly, the application of the arm's length standard
does not have to result in a firm, single number. The law now
acknowledges that the proxy nature of transfer prices calls for a range
of numbers that may be reasonable. A variety of mechanisms attempt
to produce a single dollar figure out of this range because taxes
inevitably must be calculated on a single amount of taxable income
produced from that figure. 76
The only clear and firm aspect in this analysis is the reliance on
markets and market prices. It reflects a very strong assumption about
the efficiency of markets and the "accuracy" of prices produced by
them. Another salient aspect of the analysis is the belief in the ability
of taxpayers, via professionals in the field, to establish workable
transfer prices, i.e., to find and choose among comparable transactions
in most cases, to adequately adjust prices when perfect comparable
are not available (always.. .), and reasonably choose a single figure
from a range of reasonable transfer prices (the arm's length range).
One's initial response to this statement should be of puzzlement,
since these are all excessively strong assumptions. Indeed, the
limitations of markets are well known, as is the predictable uselessness
of a search for perfect comparables, yet the system continues to be
based on these principles. In fact, the arm's length standard is
constantly gaining force, and is at the present established as the
universal standards of transfer pricing. I elaborate on this
development next, yet, before I proceed I should say that, of course,
the grim picture of transfer pricing I portray in the above paragraphs
is not complete. We will see that in practice the rules themselves
increasingly divert away from the arm's length standard, albeit not
explicitly." Nonetheless, the government insists on the continuing
prevalence of the standard and maintains it as a leitmotif and primary
78
interpretative guiding principle in the context of transfer pricing.

76 There is an inherent conflict between the valuation mechanisms
used in the

practice of transfer pricing and the taxation context within which they operate. The
invention of the arm's length range concept intended to accommodate valuation since
this is what valuation does in business: produce a range of numbers that the business
parties can use in their negotiations of prices. Our transfer pricing rules make this
leap (skipping the negotiation part) and pretend that a price can statistically (or
otherwise) be produced from the range. See, e.g., Hagelin, supra note 12.
'n See discussion supra note 12; infra note
80.
78 For a recent example, albeit in the cost sharing context, see
Molly Moses,
Musher, McDonald Seek Technical Fixes, Defend Proposed Rules' Arm's-Length
Nature, 14 TRANSFER PRICING REPORT 825 (Feb. 15, 2006).
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2. Universality
Transfer pricing rules have recently become extremely prevalent
and important to global economic players as more and more countries
adopt such rules. 9 At the same time, there is a strong trend among the
countries that adopt transfer pricing laws to base their rules on the
arm's length principle.8 The universality of the standard is important
for several reasons that go beyond its effect on the international tax
regime. On one hand, it makes the transfer pricing rules' reliance on
the standard stronger, and maybe more difficult to divert from or even
"tweak." On the other hand, because an international transfer pricing
regime is being erected, it may be possible to make changes and
develop a more desirable mechanism in a more effective manner at
the multinational level, since the foundation for such discourse is
already in place.
Transfer pricing rules are strange (even in comparison to
international tax rules in general) in that their substance is completely
unilateral. This is strange because their purpose is to effectively divide
income between two (or more) tax jurisdictions by setting the transfer
price on a transaction, the income generated by which may be subject
to tax in these jurisdictions. Still, except for the general expectation to
base the rules and determinations on the arm's length principle,
countries do not coordinate the substantive implementation of the
rules. Increasingly, countries do coordinate the enforcement of
whatever rules they employ, and even the documentation, yet the
"prices" determined by the countries involved could be very different.
If a tax treaty applies, it is likely to somewhat alleviate this problem
by requiring one bilateral treaty member to respect its treaty partner's
tax authority's "adjustments,"8 yet there is no requirement or

See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, 2007-2008 GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY,
supra note 8; see also LEVEY AND WRAPPE, supra note 4, at 1180.
80 OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES
79

AND TAX ADMINISTRATORS, 1-6 (1995), reinforced by ERNST & YOUNG, 2005-2006

GLOBAL TRANSFER PRICING SURVEYS, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that some
countries converge on the principles of transfer pricing, yet they take different
approaches to its enforcement); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 19, at 170 (telling the
story of Mexico, which adopted non arm's length based transfer pricing rules and was
pressured to adhere to the universal norm by the international community,
particularly OECD); Jaime Gonzilez-B~ndiksen, Mexico Amends Transfer Pricing
Rules, 97 TNI 27-24 (Feb. 10, 1997).
81 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Apr. 29, 2000, as
updated on 15 July 2005 [hereinafter "OECD Model"], article 9.
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arrangement for them to agree on the transfer prices themselves.8
The only arrangement that currently does this is a multilateral
advanced pricing agreement (APA), which is extremely rare, 83 time
consuming and costly. Most importantly, an APA is initiated and led
by taxpayers rather than the involved tax authorities. Advocating a
change in approach towards a more cooperative effort at the
substantive rules level is a major theme of this article. The scope of
this need goes beyond that of this article,8 yet I will demonstrate that
it is particularly important in the context of valuation of intangibles
for transfer pricing purposes, and therefore relevant here.
Furthermore, I am not conducting a comparative study or
analysis. I limit my comments and proposals to the U.S. context, yet,
since some of the issues are multilateral in scope I elaborate on them
to the extent they are relevant to U.S. tax policy. Next, I elaborate on
an aspect of the U.S. transfer pricing law that is not universal, and
actually departs from the arm's length principle.
3. Commensurate with Income
This single amendment to section 482, enacted in 1986, requires
taxpayers in the context of transferring intangibles, to consider the
(actual) realized profit from the exploitation of the transferred
intangible.8s Accordingly, the "original" transfer price - determined
before the profit potential was realized, and frequently without
sufficient or adequate comparables - must be adjusted to reflect
changes in that income. Practically, taxpayers are required to make
"periodic adjustments" (normally on an annual basis) so that the
transfer price (royalty) would be commensurate with income. 86
This is, of course, a major deviation from the arm's length
There is a mutual agreement procedure that may reach that result, but it is
long, costly, and requires a persistent and powerful taxpayer to convince her
government to initiate the procedure. See id. at articles 25, 9 2.
83 For example, in 2006 - a productive year for the APA project
- the United
States concluded only one multilateral APA. See I.R.S. Announcement 2007-31, 200712 I.R.B. 1.
84 See Brauner, supra note
21.
For a review and a proposal to use the modality of a multilateral APA as the
primary device of an international transfer pricing regime, see Eduardo A.
Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Proposal for Simplification (The
Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 1228, 2006), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=5850&context=expresso.
86 See Treas. Reg. §1.482-4(0(2)
(2006).
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standard, and an unusual deviation from the normal application of the
realization principle at the basis of our income tax system. It requires
determination of transfer prices based on (actual) income rather than
market pricing, and it allows hindsight," which formerly was ruled
impermissible in transfer pricing.8 The rest of this section elaborates
on the different valuation approaches, including the differences
between the income approach and the market approach, but in the
interim, one should note that the commensurate with income
legislation sends an important message. First, it acknowledges that
pure arm's length analysis based on comparables in the tradition of
the market approach is not always sine qua non. Second, it emphasizes
the importance of transferring intangibles in this context, and the
complexity of determining transfer prices for their transfer that
require the only special statutory rule we have (the "commensurate
with income" addition). It admits, at least in the context of intangibles
that good comparables are not always available. Finally, it implies that
a unitary approach may not be feasible for a workable transfer pricing
regime, so that we may need a variety of rules to deal with the
complexity of the transactions involved.
Deviating from the unitary rule or approach itself has serious
implications, primarily complexity consequences that are inherent in
any legal regime that applies different rules to different situations that
are not always easily distinguishable. The key questions are when
should the commensurate with income standard apply and when the
arm's length standard is sufficient to reach an appropriate transfer
price. Leaving the choice to the taxpayers is not a good solution, since
they would obviously take advantage of the opportunity to further
abuse these rules. The government would not concede, though, that
the arm's length principle is no more the single prevailing principle for
transfer pricing analysis. The government's solution was to
aggressively interpret the commensurate with income standard as if it
is subject to the arm's length principle.8 9 The regulations therefore
require periodic adjustments only in certain cases when the traditional
transfer pricing determination based on comparables is not available.90
So, taxpayers that could establish "exact" comparables were not
87

See, e.g., Kathleen Matthews, Mogle Says IRS Can Retroactively Apply Much

Of Transfer PricingRegs., 93 TNI 89-1 (May 7, 1993).
8

R. T.French, 60 T.C. 836 (1973).

89

A controversial contention that was heavily criticized. See, e.g., Andy Yood,

API Attacks White Paper for Misguided Policy, Recordkeeping Requirements, and
New Penalties,89 TNI 11-58 (Feb. 15, 1989).
90 Treas. Reg. §1.482-4(f)(2)(ii) (2006).
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bothered by it. Similarly, inexact comparables may be used without
periodic adjustments if certain requirements are met, the primary of
which is that actual profits deviation is no more than 20% from the
estimate, based on which the original transfer price was calculated. 9'
Additional safe harbors exist as well. 92 This doomed, not surprisingly,
the commensurate with income standard to its current irrelevance.
The installation of an income approach to a system that is based
on a market approach for most purposes was effectively averted
through this aggressive interpretation. Yet, this was not the end of it,
since comparables were not available to provide solutions to all cases,
no matter how little comparability was required. Consequently,
further deviation from the arm's length standard took place in the
transfer pricing establishment methods permitted by the regulations.
Now taxpayers are sometimes required to use non arm's length based
methodologies to establish their arm's length transfer prices. 93 I will
come back to this awkward reality in the conclusion of this article, but
first I want to expand a little on the basic tax policy implications of the
powerful arm's length standard.
4. Tax Policy Implications of the Arm's Length Standard
The evolution and strength of the arm's length standard was
primarily due to its practical appeal and the historic context of its
adoption. This is not the place for a full analysis of the issue; however,
it is important to realize why this standard was adopted and what the
advantages of using it are before one begins taking it apart and
criticizing some of the detailed rules that evolved from its universal
adoption. As previously mentioned, the standard developed in a
domestic setting and in a low tech, bricks-and-mortar economy. The
potential for abuse in that setting was significantly lower than it is
today and there was no risk of tax base erosion (i.e., not only no tax,
but no taxable income for which to account). Add to that the belief in
the efficiency of markets and the complementary emphasis on
commercial competition as a guarantor of perfect markets, and one
can understand the appeal of the simple market based methodology.
There was no need for complex, subjective calculations and
estimations. The "invisible hand" was sufficient. Since the stakes were
much lower, it also made sense to have less costly methodology.

91

Id.

2

Id.

93

See infra Part IV.A.
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The change in emphasis from domestic to international tax
enforcement, and the opening of global markets, combined with the
evolution of MNEs and of intangibles as major economic drivers, did
not prompt reevaluation of the basis of the system. In fact, our whole
tax system develops relatively conservatively. There is a strong
preference for change by interpretation, through "massaging" of rules
and concepts, and an almost religious belief that old concepts must be
good for new realities if we just stretched them in the right way.4
Thus, the arm's length principle persisted to become the primary
foundation of the system that now needs to deal with a completely
different world than the one for which it was adopted.
This reality resulted in an inefficient system. The main message of
this article may in fact be that this system has high compliance and
enforcement costs. Additionally, this system is very inaccurate and
generates an artificial disadvantage to taxpayers who engage in
regular cross-border, intra-group transactions. This system
particularly disadvantages those who rely heavily on intangibles in
their trade. Note that this waste does not mean that the system is
inevitably flawed. Such a determination could be made only once it is
compared with alternative systems.
Finally, although not a primary concern of this article, the bias in
favor of large, international MNEs also has fairness implications. In
the United States it seems likely that such implications will not include
distribution from the better off to the less well off.95 The system also
naturally affects inter-nation equity, which is also beyond the scope of
this article.96
In conclusion, it is difficult to justify the centrality of the arm's
length standard in the theory and practice of transfer pricing based on
the traditional tax policy analysis measurements of efficiency, equity
(or fairness) and administrability." History and perceived simplicity

For the most notable criticism of this phenomenon, see Michael J. Graetz, The
David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles,
Outdated Concept, and UnsatisfactoryPolicy, 54 TAX L. REV. 261 (2001); reprinted in
26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357 (2001).
15 The study of this effect and its extent will
have to wait for another day;
however, it will be difficult to argue that increasing large MNEs' profits will result in
redistribution from the rich to the poor.
96 This standard is not an established indicator of good tax policy. It is not
even
clear what it means and whether it is important.
97 See, Brian E. Lebowitz, Transfer Pricing and the End
of International
Taxation, 1999 WTD 186-17 (Sep. 27, 1999) (criticizing the arm's length standard and
predicting that it is unsustainable and will eventually become extinct).
94
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probably play a major role in the dominance of the arm's length
standard, and its universality fortified its position and made it even
more resilient. Against this background, I next explore the traditional
valuation approaches to evaluate the soundness, advantages and
disadvantages of the current transfer pricing "valuation" methodology
based on the arm's length standard.
B. The Market Approach
1. The Market Approach to Valuation in General
The arm's length standard is basically an articulation of the
traditional market approach to valuation. 98 Valuation is a process for
estimating 99 or measuring' °° the "value" of the subject of the valuation:
asset, liability, transaction, business, etc. Value is an elusive concept,
since there are various and different contexts of value. Market value is
the most common reference but not the only one. 011 Still, a natural
perception is that everything has a single value (or price in our
context) and in most cases the different "values" are very similar - if
not identical - to each other. Nonetheless, this is not always the case.
Some valuation methodologies attempt to establish minimal value,
while others target maximal values. Understandably, these would
produce very different tax consequences if used.
The market approach to valuation usually targets the fair market
value of the subject of the valuation.' °2 It simply uses market
transactions to produce or substantiate values or prices in comparable
nonmarket transactions.1° This is basically what the practice of
transfer pricing is currently about: taxpayers are required to establish
transfer prices for their related party transactions based on
comparable, unrelated party transactions. According to this approach,
prices are not "calculated" but observed, relying on the wisdom of the
invisible hand in the market.

See generally, SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at ch. 9.
Id. at 169 (using the phrase "an indication of value").
100 HUBBARD, supra note 11.
101 ANSON & SUCHY, supra note 64, at 31-32, 141-42.
102 One should distinguish between FMV as used here, as an economic term, and
the accounting concept of "fair value." See e.g., Mark L. Zyla, Auditing Fair Value
Measures: What Auditors Need to Know When Working with Valutation Specialists,
THE PRAcTICING CPA (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/tpcpa/
oct2003/auditing.htm.
103 See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 169.
98
99
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There are two important assumptions that drive the market
approach. One is that the comparables used are substitutable;
therefore the prices of comparable assets or transactions should be
similar. The idea is that a reasonable buyer would not purchase an
asset if she could substitute it for another asset that costs significantly
less. The principle of substitutability is completely ignored by our
transfer pricing rules. 104
The second important assumption behind the market approach is
that all maximize the value of intangibles, so, for instance, a patented
product is optimized to generate the most value in all cases.105 If that is
true, we can use all market transactions as comparables, not worrying,
for example, about comparing maximal and nonmaximal values. This
is a reasonable assumption on its face, but if we remember that some
intangibles serve as the "glue" of their businesses,' ° while others are
used as goods and other commercially available assets, it is not so
clear that all comparable transactions maximize the same values.
There may be other considerations within businesses that operate
similarly to market imperfections, which are ignored by this approach.
The key step in the process of valuation based on the market
approach is to establish proper comparable transactions. Present
sophisticated markets do not usually produce perfect comparables, so
the focus of market-based valuation is on finding the best available
sufficiently comparable transactions. First, the appropriate market for
comparable transactions is identified and defined. Then it is verified
that this market has enough arm's length transactions, among which
comparable transactions could be identified. Finally, the data about
these transactions is collected.
The value of the comparable transaction is then adjusted to reflect
the differences between the comparable transaction and the tested
transaction .108 The exact details of the comparable transactions are
explored to determine the level of comparability and possible areas
where adjustments should be made. The second determination that
the valuation expert must make (after identifying the comparable
tO4The current rules ask only whether the comparable transactions involve

similar assets and include similar terms; they do not ask whether they are
substitutable.
105 See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 184.
10

See infra text accompanying note 158.
use transactions as an example for a subject of the valuation process. This is

107 1

simply an accommodation to our topic, but market valuation similarly applies to
single assets, businesses, liabilities, etc.
108 SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 169.
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transactions) is whether the comparable transactions are good enough
(i.e., sufficiently comparable). Next, the valuation expert establishes
the level of comparability and determines the proper adjustments, if
any, to the comparable value in the process of establishing the
estimated value. Understanding that comparable transactions are not
identical transactions, valuation experts prefer several comparables
that allow them to produce a "range" of reasonable values. This way,
their product seems more scientific, it is necessarily less exposed to
refute, and provides flexibility to their clients. It is, of course, also
truer to the process, which is an art of estimation rather than a
scientific plot or arithmetically calculated value.' °9
The market approach to valuation is appropriate when an active
and extensive market for transactions identical (or very similar) to the
tested transaction exists. Its primary advantage is its reliance on
markets that seem objective. It is perceived as relatively more reliable
than subjective calculations that rely heavily on human estimations.
The market approach is also more direct, since it begins with the
comparable value or price, which looks like the desired final product
rather than extrapolation of other types of values, such as income or
costs. This approach is also somewhat flexible since it could be
adjusted over time, if and when additional data become available.
The weakness of the market approach is its very dependence on
markets, since there are not always markets sufficiently established to
work with (as is often the case with intangibles). It also depends on
the availability of reliable data, which may be rare even if an
established market exists. Comparability determination requires a lot
of information about the asset sold, and firms are very sensitive to the
confidentiality of the exact details of their most valuable assets (often
intangibles). Since small differences may produce significant value
differences, this approach is very sensitive to the availability and
quality of the data.
Like other approaches, unbundling (e.g., delineating the value of
a piece of software from the value of the hardware it runs on) creates
serious application difficulties. This is particularly true when
significant adjustments are required, because then one faces multiple
levels of potential mistakes and inaccuracies that may go in similar or
different directions, without real control of the valuation expert.
Note also that this method is least appropriate in the most
difficult cases - those cases that are more likely to be challenged and
contentious - because the most unique, complex, and sophisticated
109

See, e.g., HUBBARD supra note 11.
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assets (often intangibles) naturally have fewer and less accurate
comparables. Furthermore, even if comparable transactions exist,
firms are particularly protective of the relevant information about
their intangibles. This information is required to establish
comparability and estimate proper adjustments, so frequently data is
not available or is insufficient. The relative uniqueness of intangibles
and the typical lack of good relevant data present the primary
challenges to the efficacy of the market approach to valuation of
intangibles."
2. The Market Approach as Applied to Valuation of Intangibles for
Transfer Pricing Purposes
One practical limitation on the use of the market approach to
valuation of intangibles is that seldom are intangibles separately
transferred in market transactions."' They are more often transferred
as part of a whole business acquisition. Moreover, in the few cases
when they are separately transferred, the compensation is usually kept
confidential and therefore unavailable publicly."' This, of course,
means that simple application of the market approach is not possible
due to the very limited availability of good comparable transactions
and lack of 14quality data regarding the price of such comparable
transactions.1

Another, more specific limitation of this approach is its
appropriateness in valuing cross-border related party transfers of
intangibles within MNEs." 5 I chose to mention it in this section rather
than the former section because it is directly relevant to the specific
transactions that are the subject of this section. The issue is that
110See, e.g., LEV supra note 29, at 55-56.
II See SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 169.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 170 (providing some examples of the rare transactions where such prices
are publicly available).
114 Cummins equated

this difficulty to a Catch-22: "Investors must have

information about intangibles to value them; but investors do not have the
information they need because intangibles, by their very nature, are extraordinarily
difficult to value." Jason G. Cummins, A New Approach to the Valuation of Intangible
Capital 1 (FEDS, Working
Paper No. 2004-17, 2004)
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=559461; see also id. at 28 (discussing the difficulty of
measuring intangibles).
115 The general limitations of the market approach to valuation
of intangibles
mentioned in the former section still apply when that approach is used for transfer
pricing purposes.
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MNEs specifically choose to internalize the costs of and take
advantage of their hierarchical structure rather than engage in market
transactions, so comparing the transactions of MNEs to transactions
by players who choose the market as an efficient
transactional
•
116
medium may be attempting to compare the incomparable.
More
soberly, the problem is that the comparable does not and cannot
easily factor in this difference between the transactions. We
supposedly analyze the tested transactions as if they were less efficient
transactions, since in reality rational players chose specifically not to
take that road of market transaction. The key policy question is
whether this means that we simply cannot use a market approach here
or that it is just more difficult to account for the incomparability in
these cases, so further adjustments are required. If the latter is the
conclusion (the position obviously taken by current law), one must ask
whether we can effectively and satisfactorily make such adjustments,
and how.
Under current law, which is explored in more detail in the next
section, the level of comparability is not taken into account directly.
This is so despite it being the most sensitive aspect of the market
approach. It is surprising since the difference between an aggressive,
yet an acceptable comparable and an unacceptable comparable may
be very small and, most importantly, smaller than the difference
between the comparable and the tested transfer price. The level of
comparability may, however, be taken into account through
adjustments to the comparable price, yet these adjustments typically
rely on comparability themselves. Note also that the professionals
who perform the market-based valuation sell their experience and
expertise, particularly with respect to these adjustments. Being
conservative cannot therefore win them customer satisfaction, and it is
also not necessarily required to establish credibility. There are
sufficient degrees of uncertainties within the "reasonable" price
ranges, so the clear incentive created by the system is to push the
envelope and reach the price that is most aggressive, yet still within
the very wide margin of reasonability."'
116

Avi-Yonah, supra note 8, at 25-29; see also H. David Rosenbloom, Angels on

a Pin: Arm's Length in the World, TNI 2005-7755 (May 9, 2005). Rosenbloom adds an
interesting point: in the search for an arm's length price we ignore the fact that
market transactions usually are not entirely "rational." This irrationality and market
imperfections naturally are impossible for arm's length to capture.
17 See, e.g., Boos, supra note 51, at 88. There is little economic literature
trying
to model this incentive, yet the available literature supports the conclusion of this
article. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, The Impact of Transfer Pricing on Intrafirm
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Our transfer pricing rules adopt only the core application of the
market approach to valuation (the use of direct comparables). They
observe solely market transactions./ /118
for the various comparables sought
after by the permissible methods. It is worth mentioning that
professional valuators use the market approach also in other manners
to extrapolate value. They may analyze important market or other
unusual events for that purpose. An unexpected patent expiration is
one example; securitization of a specific intangible is another.1" 9 More
obviously, in a more analytical process, the value of intangibles may,
sometimes, be extrapolated from the value of the whole business that
utilizes the intangible, usually
_. 120 by discounting from such value the
values of all other properties. This is naturally a difficult and very
technical process that requires expertise and significant judgment calls
during the process. Sometimes, other approaches to valuation are
used in combination with a pure market approach in this context if,
for instance, the expert determines that these other valuation
approaches are preferable in getting to a certain value required in the
process. The transfer pricing regulations ignore these important
applications of the market approach in the practice of valuation. One
may use them as part of her use of the "fourth" unspecified method,121
yet, being unspecified, it is not regulated, and no guidance is available.
The level of uncertainty regarding its validity may be higher than in
comparison to the use of prescribed methods, even if they are less
accurate and sophisticated, which naturally factors in the risk
assessment of the taxpayer, discouraging its use.
C. The Cost Approach to Valuation
1. The Cost Approach in General
The cost approach to valuation uses the inputs (expenditure) into
the valued intangibles to construct their value assessment. 122 It is
Trade, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND MULTINATIONAL ACrIVITY 173 (James R.
Hines, Jr. ed., 2001); James R. Hines, The Transfer PricingProblem: Where the Profits
Are (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3538, 1990), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=226838; Chongwoo Choe & Charles E. Hyde, Multinational
TransferPricing, Tax Arbitrage, and the Arm's Length Principle (September 22, 2004)
(unpublished working paper), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=600881.
118 See infra Part IV.A.
119 See Smith & Parr, supra note 27, at 171-173.
120

121
122

Id. at 175-183.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-4(d) (2006).
See generally SMITH & PARR, supra note 27.
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unique in that it is based principally on known monetary values (of
these inputs) that are directly related to the tested asset. Data
availability is a major strength of this approach, since we usually know
the costs of the valuated asset's development, testing, production, etc.
The fundamental assumption behind this approach is that the
costs project (and is commensurate with) value.' 23 If the (projected)
value exceeded the costs by much, others would enter the market to
compete for such extraordinary profits. If value did not exceed costs,
rational investors would not engage in such investment.
2. Application of the Cost Approach to Valuation of Intangibles
The development of intangibles is, however, a risky business for a
variety of reasons, among which information asymmetry is probably
the most important. The relationship between costs and the relevant
(arm's length) value of intangibles is particularly questionable. A
more practical difficulty with this approach is in the choice of costs to
be attributed to any particular intangible9
are distinctively
These difficulties with the
•
-1.cost 126approach
problematic in the case of intangibles. Take the classic case of a
pharmaceutical MNE. It is typically involved in a large number of
drug development projects, only few of which result in a patented
drug and even fewer in marketable products. Such enterprises
normally have significant costs that are not directly research and
legal,
management,
administration,
costs
development
of
all
such
portion
advertisement, etc. An obvious difficulty is what
costs should one attribute to the (few successful) products that require
valuation. These include mainly sunk costs that are difficult to
attribute to any single product. Opportunity costs are also particularly
problematic since they need to be calculated, based not on certain
available dollar numbers, but rather on uncertain assessments.
Similarly to the difficulties faced by the market approach, the cost
approach to valuation of intangibles must rely on estimates, rather
than real market prices, for its bases for the valuation - the costs of
production (comparable assets/transactions in the market approach's
127
case), which further reduces its accuracy and effectiveness.
123
124

Id. at 156.
A key factor in this disparity is the lack of markets for some intangibles. See,

e.g., Hagelin, supra note 12.
121 See, e.g., ANSON & SUCHY,
126 SMITH
127

Id.

supra note 64, at 33.
& PARR, supra note 27, at 156.
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This is not the sole difficulty, however. First, even though many
development projects fail to deliver marketable products they may
still produce knowledge or ideas that may assist in the development of
other or future products, or even trigger a breakthrough in the
development of another product. The measurement, and more
problematically the attribution of this contribution is very difficult, if
even possible - remember that the valuator is normally not part of the
development team, nor does the valuator have any relevant
development expertise. Second, it is well known that human capital
contributions are difficult to measure and attribute. Think about any
technical difficulty that is solved in a trial and error, and brain
storming process. The heart of any solution often comes as an "idea" a eureka experience that is clearly a result of many factors involved,
including the education and experience of the person who came up
with the idea, his or her education, etc., yet how can one distill all
relevant factors and attribute the costs involved to the specific
solution? If we think about such a scenario, it is easy to imagine why
some research and development projects are relatively quick and
cheap, while some are very lengthy or costly. At the same time, it is
not necessarily the case that costly projects would be successful or
result in more valuable outcomes than the cheaper projects. This is
the first difficulty mentioned above, which led many to be skeptical
about the utility of the cost approach in the context of the valuation of
intangibles. I come back to the difficulties later in this section, yet,
next I discuss the various practices of valuation based on the cost
approach.
3. The Cost Approach to Valuation in Practice
The basic questions asked in cost based valuation are how much
will it cost to replicate or replace the tested asset. 128 Note that
replacement may mean replacement with an asset that is not identical
to the valuated asset, but rather an asset that will be "of equivalent
utility," which may mean a less costly asset than the one being
tested.129
One version of the cost approach therefore takes the historic costs
attributed to the intangible asset and depreciates them over the asset's
130
estimated useful life, to produce current value, in current dollars.
Different depreciation methods may be used, as well as different
128

Id. at 159.

129

Id.

130

This method is sometimes called "trended historical costs." See id. at 160.
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accounting of the costs - they may or may not be adjusted for
inflation, for instance. The fundamental outcome of this approach is a
minimal value, yet always meaningful in relation to cost."' It is
therefore understandable that in some cases very valuable assets are
given relatively low valuation by this approach, and in other cases
worthless assets (such as assets driven out of the market by superior
competing products) are still considered valuable since they were
costly to develop. Such divorce between the valuation and the
economic reality results from the failure of the cost approach to take
into account any factors that are external or later in time to the
development process.
A variation on this method attempts to correct this failure by
asking what one would need to spend now (rather than what one has
spent in the past) in order to replace, manufacture or reproduce the
valuated asset. The advantage of this variation is that it avoids two
major uncertainties that valuation based on the cost approach faces:
the asset's useful life and the most accurate method of depreciation or
trending (stated in current dollars).132 This is also a more flexible
method. One often asks what the costs would be to produce
something other than an exact replica of the valuated intangible that is
nevertheless similar enough to replace the intangible (e.g.,
functionally, monetarily). Note that even under the best conditions
the variation is different from the basic method, and results in
different values, since it reflects market and technological changes,
and, if relevant, actual inflation.
The replacement costs variation may improve the accuracy of
valuation based on the cost approach, yet it still always represents a
minimum value approach, assuming rationality, whereas the other
methods' outcomes may be minimal, maximal or anything in between.
This is because we assume that an asset owner would not be willing to
sell it for less than the costs of producing it. 13' Then again, why would
one pay more than these costs if she could alternatively just go and
produce it herself spending the same costs? Of course, some sellers do
sell assets for less than cost, and many buyers pay more than cost
because to them it may cost more to duplicate the asset or because the
risk of failure in producing the asset is too high (a factor which is

See, e.g., ANSON & SUCHY, supra note 64, at 33.
132 The value of the remainder may be a third uncertainty
avoided, but I ignore it
in this discussion.
133 This is the economics substitution principle.
131
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114

4. Assessment of the Cost Approach
Naturally, the cost approach is best used closest in time to the
launch of the product and in simple cases. Once data on income
potential is available, its reliability fades since it does not reflect this
potential. This is why the historical costs version is often considered
inappropriate in our context. The replacement costs version does not
fare better because of the uniqueness of intangibles, and the fact that
many intangibles are very asset or business specific. This means that
they may have little value in circumstances other than the one in
which they are used. Any functional replacement may represent
significant deviation from the real value of the intangible to the
taxpayer who owns it (and is required to establish a transfer price for
its transfer).
Finally, coming back to the question whether this approach is
appropriate at all, there are competing positions. Farok Contractor
views research and development costs as sunk costs that have nothing
to do with the final value of intangibles."' So, the potential strength of
this method - available data - may end up being its weakness, since it
is poorly equipped to generate a good value estimate. Conversely, at
least in some cases and with some types of intangibles, it is possible
and maybe only possible, to rely on costs as a predictor of value.
Think of branding, especially in the context of advertising, or of
cohesion of workforce, or management tools, or methods related to
experience. In these cases it is likely that costs will be a better
predictor of value than in intangibles that require a "eureka"
experience; yet, even in the latter cases costs may be relevant to value
in some industries. All (legally protected) intellectual properties'
values rely heavily on fulfillment of regulatory requirements. Think of
human trials or detailed mechanical patenting, etc. Such costs are
crucial for the value of the intangible assets, and they may even
overwhelm the costs of their "discovery." This, of course, does not
mean that they are better predictors of the real value of these
intangibles.
Not surprisingly, the value of the cost approach to valuation of
134

This and other market imperfections are externalities (external to the

production of the intangible itself) that cause the price to be different from cost.
135 Farok J. Contractor, Intangible Assets and Principlesfor Their Valuation,
in
VALUATION

OF INTANGIBLE

Contractor ed., 2001).

ASSETS

IN GLOBAL

OPERATIONS

3-24 (Farok J.
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intangibles depends, among other factors, on the types of intangibles
valuated. New technological or scientific ideas seem obviously
inappropriate for this approach, at least in most industries, and the use
of the replacement costs' version does make it better, no matter what
adjustments are made. 136 At the same time, minor improvements of

such ideas once in the market seem less unreasonable for this
approach, since the fundamental idea had already been established
and tried. Branding is another example where maybe the cost
approach can be useful. 117 This is not clearly the case, however, if one

thinks of trademarks. The creation costs may have direct relation to
the value, yet future costs pose a challenge. It is very difficult to
distinguish between maintenance and enhancement costs; the former
should not affect the value while the latter should.1 8 In conclusion, the
cost approach is not considered appropriate as a primary valuation
method for intangibles; it rather serves a secondary role to support
value indication in addition to other methods.139

In contrast to the input based cost approach the next discussed
approach is based on outputs only - the income generated by the
tested intangible assets.
D. The Income Approach to Valuation

1. The Income Approach in General
Value reflects the worth of all future benefits expected from an
asset. It could therefore be calculated at any time by discounting these
benefits to present value. This is basically what the income approach
to valuation does. It uses the expected stream of income from
intangibles to determine their (present) value. It discounts this stream
taking into account the timing of the expected income and the risk
associated with the realization of these expectations. 14° Successful
valuation based on the income approach requires reliable projection
of the income stream, its duration and the risk associated with its
generation. The better the data is regarding these three factors, the
more reliable the valuation will be.
Some intangibles pose significant challenges for this approach,
136 See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra note
137

27, at 168.

For good examples of the use of the cost approach to valuate trademarks, see

id. at 166-167.
138 For a good discussion see Boos, supra note
51, at 78 n.253.
139 SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at
168.
140 Id. at 185.
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since it is not simply a direct income stream that this approach wishes
to measure, but rather all the economic benefits of the measured
asset.141 Some intangibles do not result in a distinct, separate income
stream, but rather enhance an existing or another income stream, or
generally increases the firm's value or its capacity to generate income.
Moreover, some intangibles - (legally protected) intellectual property
in particular - are capable of generating extraordinary profits for a
period of time, which is not common in our competitive markets. 42
Hence, the valuation of these intangibles is more difficult and unique
than other assets.
A key difficulty of using the income approach in the valuation of
intangibles for transfer pricing purposes is that transfer pricing
valuation usually takes place in an early stage of the intangible asset's
exploitation. Since successful intangibles can get very valuable very
fast, which should make their (later) transfer very costly in term of
taxation, taxpayers typically plan ahead and establish their structure
for tax planning purposes ahead of such time. The result is that the
valuation of such assets for transfer pricing purposes must rely on
relatively uncertain projections with little or no actual data on the
income generated by such assets. Note that this is not the typical
situation that valuators face, since typical valuations are in a context
of market transactions in "existing assets," assets that are ready for
exploitation. This reality makes their expertise less reliable in our
context.
The benefits' projections are the raw material, with which
valuation experts craft their product (value), yet income stream
projections are sensitive to competing interests within the firm,
especially in technology-rich enterprises. This is because of the
various effects of too low or too high of a projection on the
corporation's short and long-term performance. For example, a
corporation raising money normally wishes to inflate these projections
to entice investors. Current shareholders also benefit from that
because the higher the projection, the higher the value of their stake
in the corporation. On the other hand, tax considerations (other than
transfer pricing) may pull in the other direction to the effect of
shareholders wanting low projections to reflect low valuation of their
current stakes in the corporation.1" Against this background, transfer
141
142
143

Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 156-57.

i4 For example, employees who received restricted stock in exchange for
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pricing valuation is supposed to get at the "right" price. This sounds
good, maybe, in terms of corporate governance and other regulatory
purposes, yet, for the purposes of this article, the important point is
that external pressure exists to push the boundaries of the appropriate
transfer pricing range as far as possible from a comfortable consensus
zone. I will get back to this point, yet, next, I discuss the basic
operative aspects of using this approach.
2. The Operation of the Income Approach
The first step in any valuation engagement, particularly in income
based valuation of intangibles, is to clearly identify the subject of the
valuation. This is particularly challenging in the context of transfer
pricing. On one hand, the taxpayer controls this process and leads the
valuation to focus on intangibles transferred within a MNE as
identified and intended (and planned for) by the MNE taxpayer. On
the other hand, in sophisticated transactions, the taxpayer or the
planning advisors may err in the process of identification and isolation
of transferred intangibles, which opens the door for the government to
argue for valuation of separate intangibles transferred. If sustained,
this argument requires reworking of the whole valuation process since
intangibles often operate synergistically with other assets that may or
may not be transferred at the same time. In addition, the valuation
techniques used may need to be reconsidered because the new set of
intangibles and the relevant data available may require changing
them. Even if the tested intangibles are easily identified, it may be
very difficult to isolate income attributed to one intangible from
others when such intangibles act in concert together and
synergistically, but the transfer pricing rules require us to valuate only
services are not required to pay tax upon receipt of this stock, but rather once the
restriction is removed, and then they pay at ordinary income rates. I.R.C. § 83(a);
Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1 (2003). Nonetheless, section 83(b) grants these taxpayers with the
option to elect to pay current tax at ordinary income rates on the current value of
their stock (even though a realization event did not occur), and in exchange any
future value increases will be taxed, when realized, at the preferred capital gains rates.
It is not difficult to see that these taxpayers wish to depress the income projections if
possible, and by that, the value of their stock upon receipt. Note that other tax rules
may create incentives in the other direction. For example, the PFIC rules provide
exemption from their disadvantageous effect on the start-up year for corporations if
the corporation expects not to be a PFIC in the following two years and indeed is not
a PFIC in those years. Optimistic income projections help in this regard, creating an
incentive for shareholders at the least to project positive income in the second and
third years if they wish to escape being a PFIC. I chose not to elaborate on the
complex PFIC rules for the sake of brevity.
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one or a part of them separately.
Indeed, the next step is to estimate the future stream of income or
benefits. The most straightforward way of doing it is asking what
would be the royalty payment received if the taxpayer were to license
the intangible. In order to estimate such royalty stream, a marketbased analysis is required. Similar licensing arrangements are
analyzed to compare to the fictional transaction in the valuated
intangible. This process is, naturally, subject to all the shortcoming of
market-based methods, primarily if good data and similar enough
comparables are not easily available.
The valuation expert also often needs to delineate the income
attributed (separately) to the valuated intangible from other
contributors to the generation of such income, and "clean" all noise.
This is particularly necessary and difficult when the intangible is either
bundled with other intangibles or tangible properties or operates (to
generate income) in interaction with such other properties.
Unfortunately (for these purposes), intangibles are often bundled in
one way or the other. 4 1 In cases where it is difficult to separate the
income from the relevant intangible, the valuator may estimate it by
estimating the income from the bundled property minus the income
that the taxpayers would have generated from the product if it did not
have the intangible. This last variation takes into account additional
potential value (in comparison to the straightforward royalty
estimate), because it takes into account current and, more
importantly, future value that could be generated from the interaction
of the intangible with other tangible and intangible properties of the
taxpayer.146
The other elements of an income approach to valuation - timing
and risk - affect the discount rate and duration used in the
calculation of the present value of the estimated future benefits
used.4 4 The difficulty with the timing element is similar in all
valuations, and has no particular attributes due to the use in the
transfer pricing context. It requires determination of the economic life
of the tested asset. 14g This determination is, again, particularly difficult
and subjective when intangibles are considered.
One reason is the
145

See supra Part II.

146 This variation is generally more directly related to the taxpayer's business,

including potential synergies, growth, etc. in the taxpayer firm rather than what
somebody else may be willing to pay.
147 See SMITH & PARR, supra note 27.
148 See id. at 212.
149 Id. at 219.
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uniqueness of intangibles, which makes analogies to economic life of
similar assets problematic.5 Another reason is the constant change in
this area and, moreover, the constant increase in the pace of change
(especially in technology,
which makes economic life particularly
.. x151
difficult to predict).
Subjective judgment calls and sophisticated
152
modeling help,
yet they increase the level of uncertainty and
"inaccuracy," again without any account for transfer pricing purposes.
The final
component, the risk, is accounted for in the discount rate
153
used, which, similar to economic life, requires subjective judgment
calls, expertise, and a variety of optional models. There is nothing
unique in this context either when valuation is performed for transfer
pricing purposes.
Beyond the practical difficulties there is the conceptual challenge
of identifying "income." Income is not a clear concept - note this is a
different notion than income as an income tax term of art - receipts,
profits, operating cash flow, etc. may be more realistic and feasible to
estimate. Then the question is whether it is pre or after tax income
154
that one wishes to estimate.
a. The Technique of Income-Based Valuation
There are several techniques that a valuation expert may use to
measure the economic benefit of an intangible to a taxpayer. Some
are direct in the sense that they measure the benefits generated by the
tested intangibles, while others are considered indirect since they
attempt to quantify such benefits by reducing them from more
general, yet known, 155 amounts. 156 Direct techniques include premium
pricing - such as the difference between prices of identical products
when one is branded and the other is not - and cost savings."'
Indirect techniques may be used when intangibles do not directly

150 See, e.g., id.
151

Id. at 220-21.

152 See, e.g., id.
153 Id.
154 Since we perform valuation in the context of this article in order to discover
a

"price," other taxes are simply separate costs incurred; yet good tax planning views
the whole tax scheme, including transfer pricing aspects together, and attempts to
incorporate them all to effective tax rate minimization.
155 One may need to resort to these techniques when direct techniques are not
effective, primarily due to lack of good data.
156 SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 186.
157 See, e.g., id. at 186-92.
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contribute to profitability (or cost savings), or at lea'st when such
contribution is more difficult to identify, delineate, and quantify.
Synergistic benefits of intangibles such as the ones we nicknamed the
"glue" of the corporation, typically require such indirect techniques
••
158
for their valuation.
Indirect techniques include the relief-fromroyalty method described above, which asks what the taxpayer would
need to pay for its use of the intangible had it not owned it already.
This method is frequently used in practice since, despite being
indirect, it is viewed as an immediate surrogate to a distinct income
stream from the tested intangible that is usually not available. The
shortcoming of this method is that it relies on either market
comparables or rules of thumb and industry standards to establish the
appropriate (phantom) royalty rate, which exposes it to all the
difficulties that the market approach faces or the obvious inaccuracy
of rules of thumb.15 9 On the one hand the market component grants
this variation increased credibility,'6 while on the other hand it
exposes it to abuse 161 since comparables are always approximate and
we do not, and probably cannot, accurately adjust them for the level
of comparability.
Another indirect method requires comprehensive analysis of the
profit margins of a taxpayer (e.g., a corporation), starting with the
total earnings of the enterprise as a whole and making adjustments to
take into account alternative and complementary investments of the
capital of the corporation. This, of course, is a more sophisticated
method, yet it relies heavily on the expertise and experience of the
valuation expert, who, at the end of the day is a commercial service
provider to the taxpayer. Other indirect techniques
are essentially
161
above.
mentioned
methods
two
the
on
variations
3. Assessment of the Income Approach to Valuation of Intangibles
The income approach usually includes multiple layers of estimates
- income or its proxy, useful life, discount (interest) rate - and
hence layers of uncertainty are compounded. It is therefore inherently
subjective and very sensitive to the accuracy of the estimates (i.e.,
potentially very inaccurate and somewhat capricious). It is very
158

Id. at 192. Regarding the "glue"

metaphor, see infra note 159 and

accompanying text.
159

See id. at 194.

160 ANSON & SUCHY, supra note 64, at 35.
161

Id.

162 SMITH & PARR, supra note 27, at 192-205.
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sensitive to market and industry conditions. Another major difficulty
with the use of this approach goes to the nature of some intangibles
that operate as the "glue" of the business rather than as a separately
marketable product. 63 Income from such intangibles is difficult to
delineate from the income generated by the business as a whole or
from one of its products if the product embeds various intangible and
tangible properies.
Despite the difficulties this approach is still viewed in the
marketplace as the most appropriate for our purposes. This is because
in comparison to other approaches it is more imminent with value.
Income is also ultimately the basis for taxation in our income tax
system. The reliance on future numbers, even if only estimates, allows
better reality perception than reliance on costs, which may have
nothing to do with future value of their product (the intangible), or on
imperfect "make belief" markets.
The income approach is widely used in the practice of transfer
pricing because the required data is relatively available and relatively
accurate. It also allows valuators to perform sensitivity analyses (i.e.,
changing the assumptions and observing the change in results). That
analysis provides clients with information about the importance of the
various value-driving factors in each case.161
E. Other Approaches and Conclusions
There are quite a few additional methodologies in the market that
do not conform to the traditional approaches, yet they are all basically
variations on one or several of these approaches. 166 Some of these
methods are practically important since they are frequently used in
practice.
Our transfer pricing rules use, by permitting and providing some
guidance for, only a fraction of possible valuation methods used in the

163

These intangibles are neither rare nor unimportant. See, e.g., Cummins, supra

note 114, at 3-6, 26-28.
I64ANSON & SUCHY, supra note 64, at 34.
1

Id. at 34-35.

'66 Id.; see also Robert Ackerman & Elizabeth Chorvat, Modern Financial
Theory and Transfer Pricing, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 637 (2002) (promoting the use
of financial models, particularly the Capital Asset Pricing Model); Elizabeth Chorvat,
Forcing Multinationalsto Play Fair. Proposalsfor Rigorous Transfer Pricing Theory,
54 ALA. L. REV. 1251 (2003); Cummins, supra note 114 (discussing method relying on
analysts' forecasts to estimate corporate value, not in the context of transfer pricing);
Hagelin, supra note 12.
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ordinary course of the practice of valuation. Even the market-based
approach on which our arm's length centered permissible transfer
pricing methods are crafted is not comprehensively explored. This
reality channels all other valuation techniques to the "unspecified"
method category, which lacks guidance and therefore is not controlled
similarly to the specified methods. Consequently, the regulations
leave the important valuation aspects of intangibles for transfer
pricing purposes completely exposed to abuse by taxpayers and their
advisors. The other side of this reality is that taxpayers face costly
choices due to the lack of guidance or clarity about
the risks of
16
1
another.
than
rather
avenue
valuation
one
choosing
The lack of guidance is even more problematic if one takes into
account another feature of intangibles emphasized by this article - the
fact that they are not a homogenous group of assets, at least from
their valuation perspective. We already mentioned some obvious
differences that lead to different preferences in terms of techniques
used for their valuation. The simplest example is the contrast between
commercially available intellectual property (e.g., popular shrink wrap
type software) and intangibles that are completely business-specific
(e.g., workforce in place). The former is not that different from
tangible commercially available assets and the market approach
potentially makes sense for their valuation. The latter require much
more work from the valuation expert, and the simple application of
the market approach contributes little in that process. Furthermore,
valuation experts have some generic preferences of methodologies for
different standard types of intangibles according to their different
unique economic features. Our transfer pricing rules completely
ignore this, and provide no guidance whatsoever on the distinction
between types of intangibles, leaving it completely to taxpayers and
their advisors. Interestingly, a table of valuation methods preferences
for different types of intangibles in a leading textbook notes that the
market approach is never the preferred primary approach for
intangibles (as defined for transfer pricing purposes). 169 This, of
course, exposes the inadequacy of our arm's length based regime.
The confusion is exacerbated by the lack of comprehension of the
One must understand that the various approaches and techniques do not
normally result in similar - or even close - results. See, e.g., SMITH & PARR, supra
note 27, at 253.
18 See, e.g., id. at 259; see also ANSON & SucHY, supra note 64,
at 186.
169 The unique intangible "goodwill" does have the market approach as a primary
167

method, yet, it is unique, and, note, it is included in the definition of intangibles for
transfer pricing purposes. SMITH & PARR, supra note 28, at 259 <ex.> 13.3.
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product of valuation.170 Taxpayers are required to produce a single
dollar amount, yet that dollar amount may be a product of very
different techniques with very different levels of uncertainties that are
all treated essentially the same. 171 Correcting this failing by requiring
further adjustments or statements may not improve the consequences
much, while adding significant costs. Yet, the current regime does not
even try to correct this failure, resulting in complete lack of control
over the taxation of MNEs. The next section explores how taxpayers,
the Service, and the courts operate within this tentative legal
environment.
IV. THE PRACTICE OF TRANSFER PRICING

Now that we understand better the complexity and difficulty of
the task of estimating the value of intangibles for transfer pricing
purposes, we look into how this is done in practice. As mentioned,
transfer pricing rules became an integral and important part of the
international tax regime in the last decade. Not all of these regimes
include extensive, separate rules for intangibles, yet most of them
recognize
the special difficulty that transactions involving intangibles
172
pose. This section begins with the unique rules developed in the
United States, and continues with the challenges and opportunities
that these rules present to practitioners in the field. It concludes with
the unique and independent manner in which the courts deal with
transfer pricing cases involving valuation of intangibles.
A. The Rules 73

The government has for a long time acknowledged the unique
aspects of transactions involving intangibles. This has resulted in
significant changes to the relevant regulations.1 14 The most important
170

Id. at 254.

Id. at 253.
Int'l Fiscal Assoc., Transfer Pricing and Intangibles, Cahiers de Droit Fiscal
International vol. 92a., 2007.
173 This article focuses on the transfer pricing rules, yet there are
other provisions
that attempt to regulate the cross-border transfer of intangibles, and they are
discussed in this article when relevant: section 367(d) (regarding a transfer by a U.S.
person of intangible property to a foreign corporation in a nonrecognition exchange)
and section 936(h) (rules that apply to intangible property in the hands of section 936
(U.S. possessions) corporations. Old section 1491 (1954) (repealed in 1997) was the
equivalent of section 367 regarding transfers to partnerships, trusts and estates.
174 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (2003);
Treas. Reg. § 1.482171
17
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changes were made by the 1994 regulations (over the 1968
regulations). Recently, the government further updated some of the
rules in final and proposed regulations. Before we address these
recent developments, a quick reminder of the background is owed.
1. General Rules and the Arm's Length Principle
The first modern set of regulations was promulgated in 1968. The
expansion of MNEs and cross-border related party transactions after
world war II era led to the government's revision of the regulations in
1968, which included, for the first time, specific rules for intangibles
(and services). Lack of guidance and effective enforcement led to the
only substantive amendment to section 482 itself, when Congress
added the "commensurate with income" requirement for payments
for the use of intangibles."' Congress further instructed the Treasury
to study the issue, which resulted in the "white paper" of 1988.177 Two
rounds of proposed regulations followed, which were eventually
finalized in 1994.178
The key changes introduced by these regulations were the
acknowledgement of lack of exact comparables, and consequently the
establishment of the concept of arm's length "range., 179 In addition,
the 1994 regulations installed the "best method rule."' 80 This meant
that no predetermined hierarchy between the available methods
existed, yet it required the taxpayer to defend the method chosen
based on levels of comparability and data available. The
commensurate with income requirement was relaxed somewhat as the
Service created safe harbors from its application when certain
methods and guidance were used. The commensurate with income
requirement has had little relevance since. Next, the current rules are
reviewed, including the changes introduced in the recent proposed
regulations.

6 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2004).
175 See Treas. Reg. §1.482-7 (2004); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T (2006).
176 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1231 (1986).
See text
accompanying supra note 65.
177 I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
17s See text accompanying supra note 67.
179 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e) (2006).
ISOTreas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (2006).
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2. The Analysis
a. Scope

The transfer pricing regulations apply differently to different
types of assets, so definitions are important to distinguish between
these assets types. With respect to intangibles the regulations chose a
very broad definition, specifying a long list of property types in five
categories and a sixth "expansion" category for "other similar
items."' 8'

This last category includes assets that derive value from

their intellectual content
•
182or other intangible properties and not from
their physical attributes. Assets are included in the definition, and
therefore treated as intangibles, only to the extent they have
183

substantial value independent of services of any individual.
Therefore, a primary distinction is drawn between intangibles on one
hand and tangible property and services on the other hand.
Practically, the difficulty of these distinctions is exacerbated by
the nature of intangible assets that are oftentimes bundled with other
properties into a final product. The difficulty of unbundling and
delineating the value of the tested intangible from the other
contributors to value adds to the general complexity of this
preliminary scope question.'8 Another distinction that is mentioned at

times is between manufacturing and marketing intangibles, 185 yet, this
distinction has no practical implications, since both are subject to the
same rules of transfer pricing.

181

Despite the broad definition, some important types of assets that
are typically viewed as intangibles are not included. Most importantly,
the definition does not mention goodwill and going concern. This does
181

The five categories are: (1) Patents, inventions, formulae, processes, designs,

patterns, or know-how; (2) Copyrights and literary, musical, or artistic compositions;
(3) Trademarks, trade names, or brand names; (4) Franchises, licenses, or contracts;
and (5) methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, studies,
forecasts, estimates, customer lists, or technical data.
18
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b) (2006).
183

Id.

In addition to the practical difficulty the rules provide that in some cases if
intangibles are embedded in a tangible asset that is transferred, a separate price
determination (valuation) of the intangible is not required, yet the intangible should
be taken into account for comparability purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(e) (2006)
(referring to Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(f) (1995)).
185See, e.g., LEVEY & WRAPPE, supra note 4, 420.04.
18 There may be implications in the context of cost sharing arrangements
that
are beyond the scope of this article. See id. at 410.
18
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not mean that they escape the application of section 482, yet the
commensurate-with-income requirement and the specific intangible
pricing methods may not apply to them as they apply to other
intangibles. Interestingly, temporary regulations included language
that limited the definition to "commercially transferable interests,"
language that was dropped in the final regulations as superfluous due
to the government's position that only commercially transferable
interests are subject to section 482. Other assets that are not tangible,
such as financial assets, are similarly not included in the definition
since the focus of the definition is on intellectual property elements
rather than the intangible character of assets.
Even though this part of the law seems unsettled, the definitional
stage of analysis has not presented a large number of disputes in
reality.'87 We shall return to the consequences of the fuzziness of this
definition later in the analysis.
b. Ownership
Once the scope hurdle is passed, the next step in the analysis is to
determine the owner of the intangible in question. This is crucial
because under our transfer pricing rules ownership determines who
should be allocated profits from the exploitation (or transfer) of the
property. It is particularly complex, however, in the context of
intangibles to determine ownership (in comparison to tangible
property). This is because one of the key characteristics of intangibles
is nonrivalry.'89 In simple terms, multiple beneficiaries may enjoy
economic benefits from rights embedded in the intangible assets
under analysis. The scope of these benefits is significantly less limited
than in the case of tangible properties and much cheaper and simpler
to extend and divide. For example, only one person (in most cases)
can enjoy the benefits of sitting on a single chair at any given time, yet
essentially infinite number of people may benefit from a cooking
recipe at the same time.
The regulations currently solve this problem by considering only
the legal owner' 9° as the (sole) owner of legally protected intellectual
187

The courts were asked in a few cases to interpret the vague definition,

holding, for instance, that a hospital management system was an intangible, Hospital
Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 520, 600 (1983), yet an organizational
structure of a group was not. Merck & Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 73, 88 (1991).
18 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(f)(3)(i)(A) (2006).
189 See supra Part II.B.
190 This is the case under the (intellectual property) law of the relevant
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property, which means that the rights of all other beneficiaries are
viewed as specific rights against the owner rather than rights in the
intangible.'91 This rule is retained in the proposed and (2006)
temporary regulations. However, the rule is relaxed somewhat by the
option to reassign ownership for the purposes of this analysis if legal
ownership "is inconsistent
with the economic substance of the
192
relevant transaction.'

If an owner cannot be identified by law (or contract), the owner is
determined based on all facts and circumstances, as who "controls"
the intangible. 93 This changes the decision rule for ownership under
existing (1994) final regulations. Under the 1994 regulations
nonlegally protected intangibles could have had multiple owners (to
the extent of the parties' relative exploitation rights). In the absence
of such rights, the developer of the intangible - the person who bore
the costs and risks of development - was considered the owner.194
Only one person may be considered the developer and all other
contributors to the intangibles' values are treated as "assistors," that
should be compensated. Assistors are compensated as regular
contributors or service providers, practically meaning that they cannot
share the "upside" or any extraordinary value generated by the tested
intangibles. This controversial developer-assistors paradigm was
essentially abandoned, shifting the full emphasis of the ownership
analysis to determination of legal ownership or economic control. This
means that the parties largely control such ownership determination
so long as they establish their position in their agreement. 95 The

jurisdiction
191This is effective for tax years subsequent to December 31, 2006. Note
that this
is a significant change in comparison to prior law that treated legally and nonlegallyprotected intangibles differently and allowed for multiple ownership in intangibles.
For a good description of prior law, see MARC M. LEVEY & STEVEN C. WRAPPE,
TRANSFER PRICING: RULES, COMPLIANCE AND CONTROVERSY

420 at 53-54 (CCH

2001).

192Temp.

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4T(f)(3)(i)(A) (2006).
Id. When a license includes provision of services to be performed by the
Subsidiary to the benefit of the parent (intangible owner), a separate allocation in
respect of such services is required, and should be analyzed under the so-called
service regulations. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9T (2006).
194Treas. Reg. §1.482-4(f)(3)(ii)(B) (2006). The other person/s with interests
in
the property would then be considered "assisters," who deserve arm's length
compensation for their contribution, yet are not entitled to any additional (residual)
profit. If such a person (developer) could not be identified than she will be
determined based on all facts and circumstances.
195 And the agreement has economic substance. The Service acknowledged that
193
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choice is consistently in favor of workable rules rather than
theoretically sound rules.
Directly connected to the issue of ownership are the cost sharing
rules. 116 These rules accommodate arrangements between related
parties to share the risks (costs) and benefits (exploitation rights) of
developing a certain property (particularly if it is an intangible). This
article does not separately analyze these rules, although this is a
worthy future project.1 97
c. Valuation and Attribution of Profits
Once ownership or the division of rights to income is determined,
transfer prices are required to be established using one of four
methods (discussed below) recognized by the regulations for the
valuation of intangibles. The taxpayer must use the "best method,"
198
The valuation of the
based on all the facts and circumstances.
intangible and related payments must be commensurate with the
income earned by the Transferee from its commercial exploitation. 99
These payments are subject to adjustment to ensure that the
commensurate with income standard is maintained. No such
adjustment is made if the valuation is based on a transfer of the same
intangible to an uncontrolled taxpayer under substantially the same
circumstances, and if the valuation is based on one of the permissible
methods (comparable uncontrolled transaction, profit split, or
comparable profit method) provided certain safeguards are met.
Included amongst these safeguards is the requirement that actual
aggregate profits vary by no greater than 20% of the anticipated
profits from the use of the transferred intangible.
As already mentioned, the Service has not strictly enforced the
commensurate with income requirement. This presents conceptual
and practical difficulties that have yet to materialize into a clash
between taxpayers and the government. The potential for such a clash
still exists. In effect, this standard requires the use of hindsight that
conflicts with the concept of price (determined ex ante) and the arm's
length principle (that is based on market pricing, and market risks
in the preamble to the 2006 temporary regulations. T.D. 9278, 2006-34 I.R.B. 256.
196 Treas. Reg. §1.482-7 (2004).
197 The rules, and consequently these cost-sharing arrangements were extremely
tax advantaged and therefore became very popular in tax planning, although note that
recent regulations attempt to stop some of their abuse.
198 Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(c) (2006).
199 I.R.C. § 482.
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without the benefits of hindsight). Commensurate with income must
mean that the Service shall revisit the appropriateness of a transfer
price from time to time in light of actual income streams, yet no
guidance or clear rules exist about how that shall be done. Literally,
this requirement allows the government to become a partner in a
transaction at will, enjoying unexpected success, but not failure. This
is a major departure from the usual position of the government in our
tax system. Indeed, the 1988 white paper explicitly acknowledged the
difficulty of reconciling the commensurate with income requirement
with the arm's length standard. 2°°
The white paper attempted to deal heads on with some of the
most important difficulties of transfer pricing enforcement, yet it
faced strong criticism, and resulted in (two rounds of) regulations that
left many of the difficulties unresolved. The government attempted to
maintain flexibility in its enforcement of section 482. Flexibility,
however, has another side, resulting in a de facto decline of the
commensurate
with income requirement's
importance and
effectiveness.
3. The Intangibles Methods
The 1994 regulations established the current set of acceptable,
distinct transfer pricing methods for intangibles that a taxpayer must
use. 20 1 All of these methods are subject to the general transfer pricing
application principles: the requirement to use the "best method, 20 2 in
each case; the guidelines for comparability analysis;' °3 and the
204
provision about establishment of an arm's length range. In addition,
these methods must produce an arm's length price that is
"commensurate" with the income attributable to the intangible.20 '
a. The Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction ("CUT") Method

26

This is the classical arm's length method. The transfer price is
established based on a price charged in a "comparable uncontrolled
transaction." This is a parallel method to the tangibles' comparable
200I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 CB 458.

201Treas. Reg.§1.482-4(a) (2006).
22 Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(c) (2006).
203Treas. Reg.§1.482-1(d) (2006).
2o4Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(e) (2006).
205I.R.S. § 482; Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-4(a), ((2)
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c) (2006).

(2006).

2008]

Valuation of Intangiblesfor Transfer PricingPurposes

129

uncontrolled price ("CUP") method 2 0 adjusted for the fact that with
intangibles it is rare to have comparable transactions with similar
enough properties. Its emphasis is therefore on the nature of the
transaction: term, rights transferred, etc. °8 The similarity of
transferred property is also important, yet, the regulations project
understanding that it may be a less of a factor than in the case of
tangible property. In order for intangibles to be comparable, they
must have similar profit potentials and they must relate to the same
types of products or processes within the same markets. 2°' Again, the
functionality rather than simple, actual sameness is important.
Two types of adjustments to the price are required. First, the
regular adjustments to reflect level of reliability (or really
comparability), which normally take place in the construction of the
arm's length range. Second, to adhere to the commensurate with
income requirement that is specific for intangibles, periodic
adjustments are required to adjust to the change in circumstances and
potentially to data reliability (and availability) changes. 1
In general these adjustments are left to the expertise of the
evaluator since the standard for these adjustments is to take into
account all facts and circumstances. Adjustments, however, are
allowed only if CUT is indeed the best method, so, for instance, the
circumstances of the compared transactions are similar enough
("substantially the same" in the language of the regulations), and only
if the differences that exist are minor and have a definite and
reasonably ascertainable effect on the price. 212
CUT is the most direct method to apply the arm's length standard
and despite the reluctance of the regulation to establish hierarchy
between the transfer pricing methods, the regulations indicate the
CUT's method superiority when it is possible to use it.213 It is, of
course, also the most direct application of the market approach to
valuation in this practice. Similar to other market based methods, it is
highly sensitive to the availability, reliability, and completeness of
relevant data.
207 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b) (1995).

208 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2) (2006).
209 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(1)
(2006).

Note

that

the

former

requirement essentially requires the use of the profit based valuation (net present
value of profits or future "benefits" from the property) in the analysis.
210 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(e) (2006).
211Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(2) (2006).
212 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii) (2006).
213

Id.
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This is quite apparent from the examples that the regulations use
to demonstrate the application of this method."' Not surprisingly, in
practice the importance of this method has been marginalized. 215
216

b. ComparableProfits Method

The goal of the Comparable Profits Method ("CPM") is to
evaluate the transfer price charged based on "objective measures of
profitability" derived from market transactions in similar
circumstances and similar business activities. Specifically, the
transferred intangible's value is determined by comparing the profit
(operating income) that the tested party (the controlled transferor or
transferee of the intangible) generates from such intangible with the
profit levels (operating income) of the comparable uncontrolled
parties.
This is a statistical method in the sense that it does not use single
comparable transactions to establish an arm's length prices, but rather
uses similar types of transactions to generate profit levels. The tested
party is usually the least complex of the related parties and the one
that posses assets that make it directly comparable. 217 Similarity is
determined based on a set of "profit level indicators., 218 These
214Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(4) (2006). The first example describes the
licensing of

a patent to producers in essentially identical and neighboring countries, when in one it
is licensed to an unrelated distributor and in the other to a subsidiary. This is, of
course, a very unrealistic example since it is so narrow. The first example is also
useless because one would imagine that a patent holder is likely to make similar
business decisions in the processing of penetrating two identical and neighboring
markets such as those described in the example. Hence, even if the circumstances
described in the example were realistic, it would typically not make much sense to
operate in one country through a subsidiary while licensing to an unrelated partyproducer in the other. Example 2 emphasizes how limited the first example is by
warning that if in one of these identical countries the incidence of the relevant disease
is much higher than in the other then CUT could not be used even in this case. The
third example simply explains the application of the interquartile mechanism for the
establishment of an arm's length range, and the fourth example states that licensing of
similar drugs may not be comparable if their profit potential is different - because one
faces competition in its market that the other, being superior to others, does not face.
It is easy to see that the examples do not serve to promote the use of CUT - rather
the opposite. Furthermore, they provide no insights about the actual process of
assessing comparability reliability and adjustments.
215 LEVEY & WRAPPE, supra note 191, at
440.01.
216 Treas. Reg.§ 1.482-5 (2003).
217Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(2) (2003).
218Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(4) (2003).
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indicators are various ratios of profits, costs, or resources that may
provide information about businesses. An important factor in the
choice of profit level indicator used is the availability and reliability of
data to support the calculation of the ratios.219 The regulations indicate
that the ratio used should be the one that best indicates the profit
level that the tested party should earn, yet there is very little guidance
provided to explain how one should go about making this choice of
ratio. The implication is that practicality trumps relevance and of
course accuracy in this context. The regulations mention specifically
the rate of return on capital employed, i.e., the ratio of operating
profit to operating assets. Naturally, one must be able to value
operating assets for this purpose. 220 This is the exact thing we are
trying to derive in the case of valuation of intangibles for transfer
pricing purposes, which makes this ratio useless in most relevant
cases. The regulations go on to mention financial ratios 2 1 as
appropriate in cases when there is close functional similarity between
the tested transaction and the sources of the statistical comparable
222
information. The regulations add that the composition of operating
expenses is important if these ratios are used. Both of the above
sensitive points (functional similarity, and composition of operating
expenses) are likely to be problematic in the case of intangibles,
because intangibles are inherently unique in many cases, and, more
importantly, it is likely that the data about these factors will be
particularly unavailable and unreliable for intangible heavy
enterprises. The one example in the regulations that refers to
intangibles does not deal with any of these difficulties that are unique
223
to intangibles.
Anyway, profit ratios are used to establish the profit relationship
between the tested and uncontrolled party. Relevant considerations in
determining whether an uncontrolled party is comparable include cost
structures, internal processes, management, market risks, assets, and
resources. Adjustments must be made to the profit indicators to
account for any significant differences between the tested and
224
comparable uncontrolled party.
Targeting comparability of profit levels and types of transactions

219

220
221
222

223
224

Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(i) (2003).
Such as operating profit to sales and gross profit to operating expenses.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(4)(ii) (2003).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(e) ex. 4 (2003).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(c)(2)(iv) (2003).
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rather than actual prices in actual specific transactions makes this
method more feasible then CUT, yet the CPM method is further
removed from a model application of the arm's length standard. The
CPM method essentially ignores the unique characteristics of
intangibles that make them more difficult to value under this and
other methods.
c. Profit Split Method 25
This method tests whether the allocation of the combined
operating profit (or loss) between the related parties is at arm's
length. The taxpayer must first identify the most narrowly defined
business activity that includes the tested transactions (with respect to
which reliable data is available). Then the taxpayer must allocate the
combined operating profit (or loss) from such business activity
between the related parties. This allocation must then be compared to
allocations of profits between unrelated parties in similar
circumstances, to test for appropriateness.
The regulations permit two versions of this method.2 6
Comparable profit split simply observes the percentages of profit
allocated between unrelated parties and applies these percentages to
the transactions between related parties, when and if appropriate. 227
Adjustments may be made for any differences between the tested
parties and the parties in the comparable market transactions, and this
method can be used even if differences are material so long as the
adjustments can be made. 228 In practice, this method is very similar to
CPM. 229 The second version, the residual profit split method, allocates
the profit first to "routine contributions" of the parties to the relevant
business activity, which assumes that attributing simple (normal)
profit to such contributions is a relatively simple process. Next, the
residual profit (not allocated to routine contributions) should be
divided between the parties according to the value of their
contributions to the relevant business activity.23° The regulations use
the case of contributing intangibles as an explicit and primary example
of nonroutine contributions that may explain the existence of residual
profits. Note that the value of such intangibles contributed is also
U5

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6 (2006).

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c) (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2) (2006).
228 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2)(ii)(B)(2)
(2006).
-9 LEVEY & WRAPPE, supra note 175, at 350.02.
230 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B) (2006).
n6
27
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required to be determined, and the regulations provide several
proposals on how to make such valuations: external market
benchmarks that reflect the intangible's fair market value;
capitalization of development costs; etc.13 This, of course, ignores
completely the very difficulty of making such valuations. This Service
acknowledged this difficulty, which led to the recent issuance of
232
temporary regulations that attempt to clarify the use of this method.
The temporary regulations disconnected the allocation of the residual
profit from the contribution of intangibles; yet, the regulations still do
not provide much guidance on how to value the contributed
intangibles, if they represent the nonroutine contributions. Similarly
to CPM, the profit split method does not seriously deal with the
particular difficulties that intangibles present. It mentions methods
that may be good for the valuation of intangibles if they are
contributed as part of the productive activity tested and if they are
nonroutine, yet even then there is no guidance about how exactly to
use the mentioned valuation methods or when to use each methods,
etc.
d. The Fourth Method233
Taxpayers are not limited to the methods specifically prescribed
by the regulations. They may use unspecified methods so long as they
comply with the general arm's length requirements (best method,
comparability, etc.). 34 A general requirement for this method is to
specify what were the taxpayer's alternatives to its choice of related
party transactions, for example prices offered by unrelated parties. 35
A specific example in the regulations describes a U.S. company that
licensed a foreign subsidiary a proprietary process to manufacture a
certain product for the European market. The European market price
231
for the product is $550 per ton and the stated royalty is $100 per ton.
In evaluating the royalty under section 482, one possible method,
subject to the best method rule, is to determine the profit that the U.S.
company would have realized if it had manufactured and sold the
product into the European market directly. Because the U.S.
company's foregone profit was $250 per ton, the regulation concludes
231
232
233

id.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6T(c)(3)(i)(B) (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d) (2006).

234 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(1) (2006).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(1) (2006).
236

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(2) (2006).
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that the $100 royalty was not arm's length.2 37 Note that this is just
manipulation of the cost plus method that was excluded from the
permissible methods for intangibles.
e. Conclusion
In conclusion, the current regulations specify a unique set of
methods for the determination of transfer prices for intangibles; yet,
the regulations fail to account for the unique features of intangibles
that justify their unique treatment. Only CUT, an essentially
irrelevant method, represents understanding that direct comparables
are generally not available for intangibles. There are very few
examples in the regulations and none of them are helpful in
understanding what is different about intangibles and how the
permissible methods adjust the traditional (tangible property
transfers) analysis to more sophisticated transactions that involve
intangibles. Next, I analyze the manner by which the courts have
applied these rules. The struggle of the courts in the few transfer
pricing cases where they were asked to do determine the value of
intangibles blatantly demonstrates the inadequacy of current rules.
B. In the Courts
The practice of transfer pricing for intangibles, particularly the
valuation of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes, are not issues
visited by the courts frequently. Only in the mid-1980s, we begin to
see relevant cases appear and decided by the courts. It also seems that
this increase in cases began to subside towards the end of the
millennium. This section reviews and analyzes the courts' positions as
they emerge from a few relevant major cases. 23s
1. CIBA-GEIGY Corporation...
This landmark Tax Court case signaled a new approach in the tax
court to these types of cases. Geigy-Basle, a Swiss corporation,
established a U.S. subsidiary ("the taxpayer") and licensed to it the
right to manufacture and sell two chemical herbicides in the United
States, the royalty paid being 10% of sales.
237

Id.

238 For a concise, yet more comprehensive

listing of transfer pricing cases
involving intangibles, see LEVEY & WRAPPE, supra note 4, at 154-56.
239 CIBA-GEIGY Corporationv. Commissioner,85 T.C. 172 (1985).
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The government challenged the royalty based on two alternative
theories, the first being that the taxpayer and Geigy-Basle engaged in
a joint venture that involved the research and development of the two
licensed chemicals. Based on the joint venture theory, the parent and
the taxpayer were joint owners of the patents on the two licensed
chemicals; therefore, each party had the right to manufacture and sell
the chemicals, and no royalty payment to the Swiss parent was
appropriate. 240
In the alternative, the government asserted that the 10% royalty
was excessive and not arm's length. Both the government and the
taxpayer submitted to the court transactions that they considered
comparable to support their respective positions on this point. The
court rejected the taxpayer's proposed comparable transaction based
on the fact that in the comparable transaction the licensee purchased
an herbicide at a mark up from a related person, as opposed to
manufacturing the chemical itself. The court found that the lower
levels of capital investment and risk borne by the licensee in that
transaction made it an inappropriate comparable. The court rejected
the government's comparable transaction as well on the basis of a lack
of evidence in the record that the circumstances at the time the
licenses were granted were sufficiently similar.
The court then turned to independently asses an arm's length
royalty. It utilized a relevant factors test prescribed by the
regulations.14' The first factor considered was a competing offer for
the license of the herbicides that was in excess of the royalty rate paid
by the taxpayer. The next factor considered was the potential
profitability of the herbicides. The court considered independent
research reports that the herbicides were superior to all herbicides
currently available in the market. The next factor considered was the
prevailing rates in the industry, these being between 3% and 6%.242
The court found that given the superiority of the licensed herbicides
they did not constitute average products. The court went on to
consider a 25%/75% rule-of-thumb profit split between licensors and
licensees, and found that the taxpayer was retaining approximately
240

There

was no documented

joint venture

agreement

to support the

government's first theory. The court did provide for an allocation to the taxpayer to
compensate it for some limited services performed for its parent based on Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9T (2006).
241 Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(d)(2) (2006).
242 A fourth factor considered by the court was the initial investment
required of
the taxpayer under Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii)(h) (2006), noting that the taxpayer
made a considerable investment, but this investment led to considerable profits.
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80% of the profits from its sales of the herbicides. Based on the above
factors, without attributing decisive power to any of them, and
without meaningful discussion of precedents, the court concluded that
the existing 10% royalty rate was at arm's length.
Note that the court accepts the taxpayer's transfer price while
rejecting the very basis for it (the taxpayer's comparable transaction).
The court carries no deference to the Service, and does not accept its
position despite the failure of the taxpayer to meet the burden of
proof. The court entrepreneurially engages in independent valuation
that convinces the court to eventually accept the "number"
(remember, the "price" used by the taxpayer was rejected when the
comparable transaction the taxpayer relied upon was rejected) used
by the taxpayer.
The court's valuation has several interesting features (that we
shall evaluate later in this article):
(1) It is not systematic, but rather uses an anecdotal multifactor
test, and further, even when making a determination, the court
refrains from providing guidance about priorities or order in the
application of this multifactor test;
(2) The court does not engage in an arm's length based
assessment, and ignores the comparability-based "valuation methods"
prescribed in the transfer pricing regulations;
(3) The court does not meaningfully discuss any precedence or
other legal sources;
(4) The court does not engage in a "scientific," numerically-heavy
valuation or any other calculation;
(5) The court seems to heavily rely on standards - industry
standards and rule-of-thumbs.
We shall see that this is not an isolated case, and that consecutive
cases partly follow this attitude.

2. Eli Lilly243
Eli Lilly, a U.S. pharmaceutical company, set up a subsidiary,
Lilly P.R., in Puerto Rico. Patents for pain medications, and know
how related to their manufacturing, were transferred to Lilly P.R. in a
nonrecognition transaction. Lilly P.R. then manufactured the
medications, sold them to Eli Lilly, who in turn marketed and sold
them throughout the United States There were significant tax
243 Eli Lilly v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 996 (1985), affd in part, rev'd in part and

rem'd, 856 F.2d. 855 (7th Cir. 1988).
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advantages to operating in Puerto Rico at the time, including an
exemption from local taxation for Lilly P.R and exclusion of its
income from that of its parent, Eli Lilly. The government attributed
all of the income related to the intangibles to Eli Lilly, and limited
Lilly P.R.'s income to that of a contract manufacturer (ignoring the
transfers above).
The court rejected
the government's
attribution, as
244
unreasonable
and turned to address the transfer price of the
medication. The court determined that the Service may make
appropriate allocations under section 482 because there was a
distortion of income between Lilly P.R. and Eli Lilly. It found that the
failure to include a royalty, lump sum payment, or cost sharing
agreement as part of the intangible transfer to Lilly P.R. is a relevant
consideration, and that the transfer price did not allow Eli Lilly to
earn sufficient profits to fund a proportionate share of its ongoing
research and development costs. The court went on to say that had Eli
Lilly been dealing with a third party, the failure to receive arm's
length consideration (such that it would be able to fund its ongoing
research costs) on the transfer of the intangibles to the third party,
would have resulted in lower prices on the transfer back (to Eli Lilly).
However, the court held that the Service's reallocations were
unreasonable and therefore the court made its own determination of
the proper allocation of income from Lilly P.R. to the taxpayer.
Because the court found that the transfer price (paid by Eli Lilly
to Lilly P.R.) should be lower to reflect the absence of a royalty
payment (paid to Eli Lilly), the court continued to independently
valuate the intangibles here. It separated the analysis to two periods.
First, regarding 1971 and 1972, Eli Lilly suggested the resale price
24 Under the arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable standard, and first issue

discussed was whether section 482 allowed the government to disregard the section
351 intangible transfer. It was answered in the negative. Section 482 can apply in
circumstances of a section 351 transfer if required to clearly reflect the income of the
parties to the transfer. The court then reviews two circumstances where section 482
may apply, the first being a section 351 transfer followed by an immediate disposition
of the transferred property, National Securities v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 600 (3d
Cir. 1943), and the second being a section 351 transfer that effectively separated the
property's income from it's associated expenses (e.g., the sale of a sugar crop to a
subsidiary prior to harvesting). Central Cuba Sugar v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 214
(2d Cir. 1952). Neither of these were applicable here. As a consequence the court
goes on to state that the Commissioner has no authority under regulation 1.4822(d)(2)(i) to disregard the intangible transfer. The court then concluded that the
government's allocation failed to include in Lilly P.R. income any amount related to
the transferred intangibles and therefore it was arbitrary/capricious.
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method, stating that the discounts Lilly P.R. granted on its sales to Eli
Lilly permitted Eli Lilly to earn an appropriate mark up upon resale.
Eli Lilly's experts based their arm's length price determinations on the
relative value of the profit generating assets and activities of the two
companies. They argued that the trademark rights retained by Eli
Lilly were of minimal value in comparison to the patents held by Lilly
P.R.; therefore, the bulk of the contribution to profits from intangibles
was attributable to the patents owned by Lilly P.R. Thus, Eli Lilly's
profits were based on its marketing activities related to the relatively
low-value intangible marketing assets (trademark rights). These
marketing profits were estimated using Eli Lilly's marketing profits on
the sale and marketing of nine other pharmaceutical products. The
court rejected this methodology, stating that the resale price method
could only be used when the determination of the gross markup
percentage was based on that of a reseller that purchased and resold
the product in uncontrolled transactions; whereas Eli Lilly used the
previously mentioned ratios based on controlled transactions. The
government argued for the application of the cost plus method. The
court rejected this approach because the government did not attribute
any income to Lilly P.R. for its intangibles.
The court decided to adopt the profit split method, and the first
step was to identify the appropriate return (based on costs) for both
the manufacturing and marketing activities and then to decide on an
appropriate allocation of income to the intangibles held by each of Eli
Lilly and Lilly P.R. The court found that an appropriate return for
manufacturing and marketing activities to be a 100% mark up on
costs. The court then made a number of adjustments to Lilly P.R.'s
cost of goods sold and to the operating expenses relevant to the
respective activities of both companies. The rest of the profits were
split based on the value of the manufacturing and marketing
intangibles, with the court considering the superiority of Eli Lilly's
marketing to that of other pharmaceutical companies and the fact that
the patent was more valuable than the product's associated
trademark. Ultimately, the court allocated 45% of the profits to Eli
Lilly's marketing intangibles and 55% of the profits to Lilly P.R.'s
manufacturing intangibles.
Regarding 1973 (the second period analyzed by the court), the
parties agreed that the comparable uncontrolled price method be
utilized due to the expiration of the patents, and the resulting entry of
a number of new competitors into the market. Eli Lilly proposed a
comparable transaction and made a number of adjustments that
increased the price of that comparable transaction. The government
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proposed a different comparable transaction, which the court rejected
noting that insufficient information was adduced about the
circumstances of the transaction and that the companies involved in
the comparable transactions manufactured significantly less volume of
the product than Lilly P.R. The court based its decision on the
comparable transaction submitted by Eli Lilly and accepted a number
of its proposed adjustments to the original sales price charged in that
transaction, which resulted in increases to the price that Lilly P.R.
could charge Eli Lilly, except at a lower rate. These adjustments
included: an amount to reflect the comparable manufacturers' receipt
of free raw materials and free equipment from the licensee, whereas
Lilly P.R. was required to purchase its raw materials; an appropriate
mark up on the sale of "sample products" that had been transferred at
cost; an increase to reflect that Lilly P.R.'s product was of a higher
product quality; and an increase to reflect the generous credit terms
on sales that were available to Eli Lilly.
Despite the somewhat confused analysis and the different
circumstance of the government's insistence on ignoring the
nonrecognition transaction, we can see similar pattern following the
court's decision in Ciba-Geigy: the court's assumption of an active
valuation role, tendency toward non arm's length based analysis
(profit split here), no account for the burden of proof, and
nondeference to the government. On appeals, the court upheld the
decision of the tax court to refuse the government's argument that it
could under section 482 disregard the intangible transfer.24 ' However,
the court of appeals reversed the tax court's conclusion that the
transfer price for the intangibles was not at arm's length.
The court of appeals stated that the tax court's conclusions
conflict with holdings that stock of a corporation is by definition arm's
length consideration. In addition, it concluded that the lower court
took a too restrictive interpretation of the regulations.24 ' The court
went on to find that the income earned by Eli Lilly on the marketing
and sale of the medications was sufficient for it to fund its ongoing
research costs. The court also noted that Eli Lilly had a wide range of
options through which research costs could be funded including
liquidating investments or borrowing. Otherwise, the court of appeals
generally agreed with the price analysis of the tax court. The only
245 See Rev. Proc. 63-10, 1963-1 C.B. 490 (addressing the issue directly
and stating

that such a transfer of intangibles to Puerto Rican subsidiaries would be respected
under section 482). The court found the Service bound by the representation made in
this Revenue Procedure.
246 Treas. Reg. 1.482-2(d)(2)(i) (2006).
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change the court of appeals made was to deny the lower court's
allocation of Eli Lilly's general research and development expenses to
Lilly P.R.
The prescribed transfer pricing methods are used solely as part of
the rhetoric, while the substantive guidance in the regulations is
completely ignored. The courts desire to make justice, even rough
justice, in the specific case, based on some feasible methodology. The
courts do not consider the implications of the decisions on the
development of the law, and show little interest in providing guidance
for future cases.
47

3. G.D. Searle1

This was a companion case to Eli Lilly, with similar facts, issues,
and basis for the court's decision. 48 The intangibles here were patents,
technical data, copyright rights, and trademarks related to
pharmaceutical products. Here the P.R. subsidiary manufactured the
products and sold them to independent pharmaceutical wholesalers.
The taxpayer (the U.S. parent) aided in securing these sales via a
marketing services agreement whereby the subsidiary paid the
taxpayer 25% of sales to promote and market the products. The
taxpayer's income decreased by 50% as a result of the agreement.
Similarly to Eli Lilly, the court respected the nonrecognition
(pursuant to section 351) transfer of the intangibles from the taxpayer
to its P.R. subsidiary, again, rejecting the government's disregard of it.
The court found, however, that although the taxpayer received stock
equal in value to the transferred intangibles, it did not receive arm's
length consideration on the transfer. The court found that any form of
consideration would be permissible provided it is a form of
4
consideration that would be used by parties dealing at arm's length.2 1
The court reviewed the taxpayer's considerable ongoing costs of
research and development and noted the fact that the intangibles
conveyed in the section 351 transaction represented more than 80% of
247

G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987).

248

Both taxpayers formed

Puerto Rican manufacturing

subsidiaries, and
transferred to them intangibles in section 351 nonrecognition ("tax-free")
transactions. Eli Lilly's subsidiary manufactured drugs later sold back to Eli Lilly who
sold the drugs to wholesalers, whereas G.D. Searle's subsidiary manufactured drugs
and sold them directly to independent (unaffiliated) wholesalers. In Eli Lilly, the
price that the subsidiary charged Eli Lilly was challenged as well as the royalty/price
that should be attributed to the parent. Only the latter price was challenged in G.D.
Searle.
249 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(2)(i) (2006).
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the taxpayers' profits and sales. Consequently, the court found that
the taxpayer would have required some form of cash payment in
connection with a sale of such intangibles to an independent party in
addition to stock (noncash producing) compensation. Thus, the court
concludes that the taxpayer's income is not clearly reflected and that it
is appropriate to impute an ongoing royalty charge in its favor.
The court then proceeded to compute the imputed royalty charge.
The taxpayer argued that it had acquired some of the intangibles
transferred through independent licensing agreements and that these
prior agreements were comparable transactions that support its
transfer price. The court rejected these transactions for two reasons.
First, the circumstances surrounding the granting of the licenses
differed. The comparable transaction involved a license of intangibles
from a French company that did not have FDA approval to market
the product within the United States. The taxpayer had to obtain
FDA approval for the intangibles and the court noted that this
involved significant risk to the taxpayer given only a small portion of
submissions to the FDA were ultimately approved. However, when
taxpayer transferred the intangible to P.R. subsidiary, the taxpayer
already had the FDA approval to sell the patented drug and had
developed manufacturing know-how. The second reason is that no
established market for the intangible existed in the United States at
the time of the French license. In contrast, the taxpayer, not its P.R.
subsidiary, holds the FDA approval for all transferred intangibles and
had the marketing infrastructure to sell the product in an already
established market. The court noted that without the approval the
value of the intangibles would be substantially diminished.
The court then stated that whether the payable is deemed to be an
additional amount for marketing services provided by the taxpayer, or
as a payment to the taxpayer for the use of its intangibles (the
"marketing" intangibles), or as a royalty payment in connection with
the transfer of intangibles, the result is the same. Then the court
without any analysis, but indicating that its decision was based on the
record, found that a royalty rate of 25% of the subsidiary's net sales
was appropriate.
Note again, the tendency to avoid detailed analysis or
calculations, and to rely on what is perceived by the court as fair
arbitrary approximation. Also, note the divorce of this decision from
the information provided by the parties and their arguments. Finally,
note that the courts do not spend much time on the fiction of
comparability - since exact identity cannot be found they simply
ignore the basic application of the arm's length principle. They do not
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stop to deal with what comparables are "similar enough" for these
purposes; they simply go on to use other methodologies.
4. Bausch & Lomb

250

The taxpayer, a U.S. corporation, created a subsidiary, B&L
Ireland, and licensed to it a nonexclusive license to use patented and
unpatented manufacturing technology and trademarks for the
manufacture and sale of contact lenses worldwide for a royalty of 5%
of sales. The technology enabled the manufacture of contact lenses at
costs significantly below that of competitors ($1.50 versus $4.50). The
vast majority of sales by B&L Ireland were made to the taxpayer (at a
price of $7.50 per lens), who then marketed and sold the product in
the United States. The Service assessed and asserted that B&L
Ireland was essentially a contract manufacturer whose sales were
assured and who was subject to minimal risks. Thus, B&L Ireland
should be allocated only its costs and a reasonable mark-up. The tax
court rejected this determination, concluding that B&L Ireland was
subject to market risks
and as such, it could not be characterized as a
,- . 251
contract manufacturer. Based upon this determination, the court
decided, against the government's position, that it was appropriate to
analyze the sale's price for contact lenses independently from the
royalty fee paid for the license of the intangibles."'
The court first tackled the arm's length price for the contact
lenses (paid by the taxpayer). It used the comparable uncontrolled
price method and found that $7.50 was not higher than the standard
price charged for contact lenses in the industry (and therefore it does
not reflect by itself a shift of profits away from the U.S. parent). The
court noted that the fact that B&L Ireland was a low cost producer
did not matter, since the market price would be equal to that of the
least efficient producer of the product. The government argued that
the taxpayer would never go into the market and pay $7.50 for a good
that the taxpayer could manufacture itself for $1.50; therefore, even if
250

Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989).

251 The court determined that the taxpayer was under no legal obligation to

purchase B&L Ireland products and that B&L Ireland had a mere expectation that its
parent would purchase its products in the event worldwide demand was not as
anticipated.
22 Once the court decided that B&L Ireland was not
a contract manufacturer,
these two payments do not tie to each other so that only a net payment is effectively
required to be determined. Both the volume and the price of sales to the parent were
subject to variations, which required separate determinations of the appropriate
royalty payments made to the parent and the sales price paid by the parent.
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$7.50 was the market price for other buyers it could not be the arm's
length price for sale to the taxpayer. The court rejected this argument,
finding that the fact that the taxpayer could have produced the lenses
itself at the lower cost amount was also of no consequence, and that
the power to determine who in a controlled group would earn income
did not justify the application of section 482.
With respect to the arm's length price for the license of the
intangibles (by the taxpayer), the taxpayer argued that 5% was an
appropriate royalty fee, but proposed that it be based on the average
realized price earned by the taxpayer on its resale of contact lenses
produced by B&L Ireland. This was a concession made by the
taxpayer at trial. The taxpayer argued that 5% was the standard
royalty fee in the industry for the license of contact lens technology,
and referred the court to two contact lens license agreements for the
use of manufacturing technology. In addition, it conducted a rate of
return analysis that found a return of 106% for B&L Ireland and 66%
for taxpayer, and asserted that this was consistent with the relative
risks borne by each party. The court found that the intangible
property in taxpayer's license agreement was superior to the licensed
intangible in the proposed comparable agreement because the
comparable agreement licensed new technology, which had not been
shown to be commercially feasible. In contrast, the taxpayer's license
agreement covered technology that had been proved to be successful
for ten years. In addition, one of the taxpayer's proposed comparable
agreements licensed new technology, which at the time of the
agreement, was not approved by the FDA to produce contact lenses.
This stood in contrast to the taxpayer's technology that was proven
and had FDA approval. Also, there was a difference in experience
between B&L Ireland and the licensees in the comparable
transactions. They were experienced manufacturers whereas B&L
Ireland was a new company that would not risk purchasing new and
unproven technologies that the more experienced companies may
contemplate acquiring. Based on these and other supporting
considerations the court rejected the taxpayer's comparables. The
government's argument was based on an appropriate mark up of B&L
Ireland costs ($1.50) and a permitted return of 50% to 100% to
manufacture the lenses, with the remainder of the $7.50 sale price
allocated to a royalty fee.
The court then engaged in an independent valuation study.25' The
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(d)(2)(iii) (2006) as authority that it may
consider prospective profits to be realized by the licensee in determining the arm's
253
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court began by reviewing the projected earnings that the taxpayer had
prepared in connection with creation of B&L Ireland, which were tenyear cash-flow projections from the proposed investment. The court
adjusted the cash-flow projections including a reduction of earnings in
years five through ten to account for the court's anticipation of the
introduction of new extended wear contact lenses and the resulting
slow down in demand for daily contact lenses. In addition, the court
factored in a reduction in price in the later years to account for new
low cost competitors entering into the market. Based on the profits
from these projections the court undertook to divide the profits
between the taxpayer and B&L Ireland. The court noted that based
on its revised profit projections that the royalty rate suggested by the
government would lead to B&L Ireland operating at a loss, while the
rate proposed by the taxpayer would result in an internal rate of
return in excess of 35%, which the court felt was inappropriate. The
court then referred to the 25/75 rule of thumb profit split between
licensors and licensees; however, it was determined that this was too
generous given the fact that B&L Ireland had nothing unique to
contribute while the taxpayer was contributing its marketing and sales
network as well as the production technology."' The court concluded
that a 50/50 split was appropriate, which translated into a royalty fee
of 20%.
By now, the reader should be familiar with the pattern:
independent study by the court, based on "fair" approximations and
rules of thumb, rejecting the parties' information (with no deference
25
to the government) and ignoring the arm's length standard.
length price).
254 The court comments that the 25/75 split is appropriate in a
normal license
situation when each party posses something unique (i.e., technology/patents/etc) and
in order to make a product both parties need to come together and share their
respective technologies.
25 In another case that I chose not to elaborate on due
to space considerations,
the tax court followed a similar thought process. It rejected the transfer prices
suggested by both the taxpayer and the government, engaged in an independent all
facts and circumstances analysis based on the large number of comparable
transactions presented to the court, and made the unsurprising judgment call and
rules for a royalty rate that is the exact average between the lowest and the highest
royalty rates charged in the comparable transactions presented to the court. Podd v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2575 (1998) (dealing in part with an appropriate
royalty rate to be paid for the exclusive right to manufacture, market, and sell a
"hideliner" (intermodal container liner system) subject to a patent held by the
developer who licensed it to a company he owned). This case is a particularly good
example for the helplessness of the court when faced with a large number of inexact
comparables and contradictory expert testimonies.
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6

5. Sundstrand2

The taxpayer expanded the operations of its wholly owned
Singapore subsidiary (SunPac) by licensing to it certain industrial
property
rights. The license permitted the manufacture of CSD spare
S257
parts, and the use of trademarks associated with the CSD, along

with the taxpayer's agreement to provide technical assistance. The set
royalty was 2% of the net selling price of each part manufactured. The
vast majority of parts manufactured were sold to the taxpayer at a
discount of 15% off SunPac's catalog prices. The Service assessed the
tax on the taxpayer based on SunPac's being a subcontractor,25' and
computed SunPac's income on a cost-plus basis, limiting it to a mark
up of 38%. Relying on Bausch & Lomb, the court found that SunPac

was not a subcontractor and that the Service's assessment was
accordingly arbitrary and capricious.
The court found that SunPac sales and prices were not guaranteed

by the taxpayer and consequently that SunPac bore market risk with
respect to its operations. In addition, the court found that the selling
price for the spare parts and the royalty rate for the intangibles had to
be addressed independently. The court found that a discount of 20%
of catalog prices is appropriate, and based its decision on agreements

that the taxpayer had with third parties. With respect to the royalty
rate, the taxpayer argued that a number of transactions, wherein it
licensed CSD manufacturing technology to independent third parties,
were comparable to the SunPac license agreement. The government
259
argued that significant distinctions existed between the agreements.

256

Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 226 (1991); see also Seagate

Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149 (1994). 1 chose not to elaborate on
this case due to space considerations.
257 CSD is a constant speed drive used to drive an airplane's engine generator
at
a constant speed.
258 This is an argument similar to the contract manufacturing argument
in the
prior cases described before. See supra note 256.
29 These differences included: (1) that the SunPac license was
limited to licenses
for CSD unit for commercial aircrafts, where the comparable transaction included
licenses for CSD units for military aircrafts and guided missiles; (2) that the SunPac
license limited SunPac's right to manufacture spare parts only, the comparable
transactions included licenses for a much broader range of products including
engineering design, manufacture, assembly testing, inspection, and servicing of CSD
units; (3) that the SunPac agreement provided that the costs of technical assistance
were to be recovered as part of the royalty and the comparable transaction required
the licensee to bear the cost of technical assistance; (4) that the comparable
transactions additionally required the licensee to pay a substantial lump-sum
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The court focused on two differences between the SunPac license and
the comparables, the first being differences in rights regarding
manufacturing intangibles and the second regarding differences in
marketing intangibles.
In the comparable transactions, the sunset provisions permitted
the continued use of unpatented manufacturing technology and data
that had been provided to the licensee during the term of the license,
for a royalty of 2% to be paid over 15 years. In contrast, the SunPac
royalty payments were scheduled to end in 8 years and thereafter
SunPac was granted access to any future improvements to CSD
manufacturing technology that may be made by the taxpayer.
Regarding the marketing intangibles, the court emphasized the fact
that the license permitted SunPac to sell CSD spare parts into markets
wherein the taxpayer had previously sold CSDs. Thus SunPac was in
essence given a captive market within which to sell its spare parts, as
once one of taxpayer's CSDs were included within an aircraft it was
prohibitively expensive to replace that unit with a different model. In
contrast, the comparable transactions were limited to selling CSD
spare parts only to the licensee's own customer, which the licensee
would have had to develop through its own marketing activities.
The court also reviewed another comparable, identified as the
Concorde license agreement. The court found two key distinctions
between this license and the SunPac license. First, the court
distinguished that the Concorde CSD involved new and untried
technology and that this led to the licensee taking on significantly
more risk in the Concorde license. The distinction was that CSD, as a
non European company was effectively prohibited from competing
directly for sales of CSDs in this market.
The taxpayer then argued that there was a 6.5% royalty rate
standard applicable to the license of CSD technology within the
industry as a whole. The court found that the SunPac license was
unique in that it included invaluable marketing intangibles not found
in other agreements. The court then stated that the 6.5% could be
utilized as a base rate upon which adjustments could be made,
particularly adjustments to reflect SunPac's limited risk and the
valuable marketing intangible it obtained via the license (these
marketing intangibles related to the captive market SunPac had for
spare part sales). The court then referred back to third party license

payment; (5) that the SunPac license was worldwide and the comparables were
limited in geographical scope; and (6) the SunPac royalty was to cease after eight
years while the comparables provided for continuing sunset royalty payments.
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agreements wherein the taxpayer licensed CSD technology to third
parties and found that portions of some of these agreements related to
sales of CSD spare parts that were permitted to be made outside of
the licensee's allocated territory. Such parts sales were permitted
when the aircraft, to which the licensee had made the initial CSD sale,
had been relocated to a different jurisdiction. In this case, a 10%
royalty fee was imposed on such sale. The court adopted this rate as
an appropriate transfer price.
Finally, the court found that all of the taxpayer's other
comparable licenses contained a separate charge for providing
technological support services. But taxpayer provided that SunPac's
charge for technical assistance was to be paid out of the 2% royalty
fee. The court held that the SunPac provision allowing for the
payment of such fees out of the royalty payment was not at arm's
length because the taxpayer would not offer this payment provision to
an unrelated party. Based on this the court found that the provision
of such services was not integral to the taxpayer's business and
allocated income to the taxpayer based on its costs of providing these
services.
The case is an important example of the discomfort of the court
with the arm's length standard and the use of comparable transactions
to establish transfer prices. It is an interesting case since it involves
comparable transactions in the same/similar product. Note that the
single factor the court adopts here from the parties' positions is the
industry standard of 6.5% presented by the taxpayer to be used as a
baseline for the court's independent recalculation of the proper
transfer price.

6. Westreco

261

The issue at hand was the proper fee for research and
development ("R&D") services. Westreco performed R&D services
(food related research) for Nestle, its parent company (headquartered
in Switzerland) for which it was paid a fee. The fee was based on
Westreco's costs and a markup of between 3.5% and 7% of those
costs. The government countered with a "salary multiplier" method to
determine an appropriate fee to be paid to Westreco. It used a
multiplier of three on all of the taxpayer's salary costs including
indirect costs such as vacation, medical etc.

260

See also Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(b)(3) (2006).

261

Westreco v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 849 (1992).
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There were certain procedural issues involved, 262 but for our
purposes, the important ruling is that the court found that the Service
made a fundamental error in basing the salary multiplier on all of the
taxpayer's 263employee costs rather than limiting it to direct salary
payments. The court held that the salary multiplier method applied
by the Service was not an accurate method to use in determining the
correct revenue for a unique firm like the taxpayers. Taxpayer then
introduced evidence to show that taxpayer's pricing practices were
similar to four comparable corporations.
The taxpayer's expert submitted these four comparables and
utilized three criteria upon which they were compared with the
taxpayer. The first was business relations with clients, where the
principle issue was the extent to which the companies retain an
interest in the product of their research or are merely conducting
research for a client whom retains all rights to the research performed.
The second was financial comparability, where a comparison of fixed
investment costs was made and the third factor was the degree of
business risk undertaken by the companies. Overall, the key factor
was the low business risk undertaken by Westreco, as all of its
expenses were covered under their cost-plus formula of payment, and
the fact that Westreco did not have to regularly solicit clients to
ensure continuity of work. A number of profit ratios of the
corporations were then compared, and the taxpayer argued that a
lower profit level was appropriate for the taxpayer due to its limited
risk. The government attempted to come with a list of different
(comparable) companies (15 companies) whose identity was derived
from their sharing the same SIC code as the taxpayer. The court
rejected the Service's comparables, noting the diverse fields within
which these firms operated, including: nuclear power plant
construction and operation, map making and breeding of research
262 Looking behind the statutory notice of deficiency. Petitioner was able
to

obtain the testimony of the CIR employee responsible for the assessment. The court
found that the Petitioner's high burden (the arbitrary and capricious standard)
entitled it to examine the Respondent and the method it used to exercise it's
discretion, and that this did not constitute looking behind the statutory notice of
deficiency.
263 Additionally, the salary multiplier method is a compensation method used
in
large engineering and construction firms for services that are general in nature (i.e.,
not limited to a specific project), and not in small R&D firms. The salary base used
was wrong also because the expert did not allocate salaries out of the salary base for
services performed to a different company that were not at issue in this case at all, and
the expert based the taxpayer's income adjustments on billing methods of two
corporations which are not comparable to the taxpayer.
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primates and canines, and concluded that they were not comparable.
Thus, the court accepted the taxpayer's methodology and found that
the fee was at arm's length.
This is an interesting case that technically focuses on services, yet
these are R&D services based on which values of resulting intangibles
are established. The case clarifies the reluctance of the courts to dive
into the comparability world. Once the court is provided with reasons
not to accept direct asset comparability, it immediately switches its
focus to more remote methodologies and reliance on accepted
commercial norms. Consequently, the court's analysis gets further
away from simple arm's length standard application that is supposedly
the ideal of our current regime. The court also, consistently, ignores
the burden of proof rules.
2 64
7. Perkin-Elmer

The taxpayer was a U.S. corporation that established a Puerto
Rico subsidiary (PECC) and licensed to it the right to manufacture
and sell spectrophotometers and accessories, gas chromatography
accessories and HC lamps (generally scientific measurement
instruments) and the provision of all design and manufacturing
information related to these products. The royalty was 3% of sales.
PECC purchased parts (described as parts kits) from the taxpayer.
The kits were intended to be assembled into a designated finished
product. PECC manufactured the products and sold them back to the
taxpayer, who then resold them in various markets. 65
The court addressed the issue of the arm's length price of finished
products independently of the royalty issue. Court used the resale
price method with reference to comparable sales to determine the
arm's length price on the sales of each finished product. Once again,
the court rejects to use taxpayer's or the Service's proposed
comparable sales on the basis that they are not comparable and then
the court independently values an arms length resale margin. With
respect to the parts PECC purchased from taxpayer, the taxpayer
argued for the comparable uncontrolled price method, an argument
the court ultimately adopted, as there were a number of other
Perkin-Elmer v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 634 (1993).
265 The Service characterized PECC as a consignment contract manufacturer and
assessed its taxes on a cost plus basis. At trial the government abandoned this position
and relied on alternative legal arguments. The court found that this abandonment of
both the factual and legal basis of the notice of assessment caused the determination
264

to be arbitrary and capricious.
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manufacturers selling identical parts. 266 The government argued that
the parts kits sold to PECC embodied various manufacturing
intangibles of the taxpayer, and that the sale price of these kits should
be adjusted accordingly. In theory the court agreed that the kits did
embody manufacturing intangibles, but felt that these could be more
simply dealt with under the royalty fee determination. The
government's experts used the cost plus method and utilized a means
of computation that the court described as novel and complex, the
court summarized one of the two variations of these computations as
follows. First the gross margin earned by the taxpayer on the sale of
such products was computed (this was based on a period before the
manufacturing license agreement with PECC was entered into and as
such involved the Taxpayer in both the manufacturing and
distribution process), this amounted to a 52% gross margin, then the
manufacturing margin was isolated by subtracting a 37% distribution
margin which was obtained from the analysis of a comparable third
party transaction involving the distribution of a comparable product.
Then the 19% manufacturing margin (based on sales) was converted
to 40 % margin over costs. Lastly this 40% margin was applied to
taxpayer's costs of manufacturing the parts kits. The expert backed
into the appropriate percentage markup on parts rather than deriving
the markup percentage directly from a comparable transaction. The
court had a problem with this because this type of indirect approach is
very sensitive and leaves little room for error.
The parties and court agreed that the comparable uncontrolled
transaction method should be used with respect to the royalty,
although each party proposed several adjustments to the arm's length
price of the comparable transaction. The adjustments made by the
court to the comparable transaction were as follows: (1) The
definition of "customers" in the comparable Hitachi licensing
agreement was in issue with the government's arguing that the Hitachi
royalty computation was based on prices for sales to consumers (end
users), while the PECC royalty computation was based on sales to
intermediaries. The court found that insufficient information was
available to determine whether Hitachi planned to sell to end users
exclusively and declined to make an adjustment. (2) The court
considered a downward adjustment due to the limited use PECC
266

The Court does use the comparable uncontrolled price method but rejects

taxpayer's calculations as ignoring certain circumstances that create differences
between controlled and uncontrolled transactions. Therefore the court independently
values the arm's length price and determines that based on the entire record that the
amount PECC paid to taxpayer for parts were arm's length.
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made of the technical manufacturing documentation as compared to
Hitachi's use of this information, due to the use by PECC of the parts
kits. The court noted that the contractual right to such documentation
was a part of the license agreement and did not make an adjustment.
(3) The government argued that an upward adjustment to the Hitachi
license was required to compensate for the limited geographical area
in which Hitachi could sell it's manufactured products (Japan and
several other countries), and the worldwide license rights conveyed in
the PECC agreement. The court made no adjustment, noting that
although Hitachi's rights were limited, there was no evidence that this
led to a lower royalty fee, or that the taxpayer's inability to penetrate
the Japanese market was responsible for a lower royalty fee. (4) The
taxpayer argued that a downward adjustment was appropriate as the
Hitachi license included the right to manufacture a broader range of
Taxpayer's products than PECC's license agreement. Although
Hitachi did not actually make use of this broader provision, the
taxpayer argued that Hitachi's option to do so had value and
warranted a downward adjustment to the Hitachi royalty fee. The
court found that the value of such an option was too speculative in
nature and did not make an adjustment.
Note again how the court accepts comparables offered by the
parties without the adjustments that the parties themselves made. For
example, the parties acknowledge that the comparables are not exact,
yet the court uses them as if they were exact comparables. The court
again is not capable of sophisticated analysis of inexact comparability.
The court essentially engages in an independent transfer pricing study,
regardless of burden of proof issues and the mode of analysis required
by the regulations.
267

8. DHL

The trademark "DHL" was conveyed from DHL to DHLI (DHL
International) in connection with the purchase by a group of investors
of a 57 % interest in DHLI. In addition, the court reviewed DHLI's
use of the trademark (without paying compensation to DHL) for a
number of years prior to that. In this case, both the taxpayer and the
government used a relief from royalty income approach (i.e., cash
method) to value the trademark, and came up with very different
results. Taxpayer estimates were 50 million, while the Service's
estimates were in the neighborhood of 300 million. The difference
DHL Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 1122 (1998), rev'd in part,
affd in partand rem'd, 285 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
27
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stemmed from their disagreement over the existence and income
attributable to other intangibles owned by DHLI. The Service says
that the trademark (the DHL name) was the primary intangible asset
and therefore the majority of the value of all intangibles. Where the
taxpayer says that DHL's other intangibles (DHL network, ability to
efficiently deliver/reliable performance, cost advantages such as the
DHL infrastructure) was the most valuable intangible asset and worth
substantially more than the DHL trademark.
In addition, both parties made reference to the purchase price
paid by the foreign investors (500 Million) for the 57% interest, and
reduced this by amounts allocated to the tangible assets of DHLI,
coming up with a value of approximately 250 to 300 million for the
companies off balance sheet assets. Each used this amount to support
their relief from royalty calculations. The taxpayer argued that the
sale of the trademark was at arm's length due to the presence of the
investors in the negotiations and the fact that the transfer was an
integral part of the investors buy in. The court found that the
Investors were indifferent as to the allocation of the purchase amount
between shares and the trademark and that the value put on the
trademark (20 Million) was tax motivated. Thus, the court found that
this was not an uncontrolled transaction.
The court took a rough and ready approach to the valuation which it seems to have done in the majority of these cases - and
started with its calculation of the value of all DHLI intangible assets
(essentially the grossed up value of the investors purchase price less
the book value of DHLI assets). The court then indicated its belief
that DHLI had a number of other intangible assets (e.g., know-how
and systems in place) that enabled it to effect distributions
internationally in an efficient and cost effective manner, and that
DHLI's growing profits were equally attributable to the trademark
and these other intangible assets. This gave the trademark a value of
150 million dollars, which the court discounted to 100 million based on
the fact that an independent third party would not pay full value for
an asset whose ownership was subject to legal challenge/62
The court continued to value a royalty fee for prior
268 The ownership of DHL in the international Trademark rights was not clear. It

was adduced at trial that the license agreement between DHL and DHLI may not
have given DHL a sufficient degree of control over the operations of DHLI, and that
this could raise the possibility that DHL had abandoned the international portion of
its trademark. In addition, DHLI made numerous trademark filings in foreign
countries under its own name and this under foreign law could lead to the conclusion
that DHLI was the owner of the DHL trademark in those countries.
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uncompensated use of the trademark by DHLI. In this context, the
taxpayer made three arguments. First, that no royalty was due from
DHLI for the use of the DHL trademark because DHLI was a
developer of the trademark. Alternatively, DHL argued that if the
court found that DHL is the owner/developer of the trademark, then
no cash royalty would be due because the mutual
agency agreement
•. 269
granted both DHL and DHLI reciprocal rights. Finally, the taxpayer
argued that DHLI's agreements with independent contractors in
foreign locations permitted their use of the trademark but provided
for no fee with respect to the trademark use. The court rejected all
three of taxpayer's arguments. First, the court determined that DHLI
was the developer of the trademark (see below). Second, the court
held that taxpayer did not meet its burden of showing that the
reciprocal benefits were within the range of arm's length. Lastly, the
court held that the royalty-free use of the trademark by independent
parties was not shown to be a sufficiently similar transaction to set an
arm's length charge.
The government adduced evidence of royalty payments for the
trademark's use in a variety of circumstances, payments ranging from
0.7 to 15%, and argued for a royalty of 1%. For reasons the court did
not review, the government's experts felt that a royalty at the lower
end of the range was appropriate. The court accepted the .75 rate and
noted that this equaled the rate which DHL had agreed to pay DHLI
for use of the trademark after the transfer of the trademark to DHLI.
With respect to the application of the developer/assistant rules,
the court concluded that due to the absence of a cost sharing
agreement with respect to the intangible and due to the existence of a
valid licensing agreement between DHL and DHLI, that DHLI could
not be a developer of the intangible. The taxpayer argued that in the
alternative DHLI was an assister under the regulations, and that any
allocation of income to it should be offset by amounts spent by DHLI
in assisting in the intangibles development. The court denied any
offset under the rationale that DHLI did not establish that its
expenditures connected with the trademark (principally a significant
amount of advertising expenditures) were in excess of expenditures
that an independent licensee would expend in similar circumstances.
In appeals, the taxpayer argued that the court failed to sufficiently
spell out its reasoning with respect to the valuation of the intangible.

269

In other words, arm's length consideration includes more than just cash

royalty payments for use of the intangible property and that the transfer or use of
other reciprocal rights can also represent fair market value.
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The appeal court reviewed the tax court's valuation and noted that it
had given a step by step account of its reasoning and that although the
method of valuation had its deficiencies ( i.e. the use of book value
may not reflect the true value of a tangible asset), the taxpayer failed
to demonstrate clear error. The appeals court did reverse the tax court
on its interpretation of the developer/assistant regulations and found
that they made an error of law in equating developer status with a
legal ownership interest in the intangible. 7° Based on the costs
incurred and risks borne by DHLI in connection with the trademark,
the appeals court found that DHLI was a developer of the
international trademark rights under the Regulations, and it reversed
the tax courts allocation of 50 million of income to DHL that arose
from the transfer of the legal rights related to the international
trademark to DHLI. In all other respects, the tax court opinion was
upheld.
On remand, 271 the tax court found that DHL had overpaid taxes in
the amount of 28.7 million, this amount included interest and
penalties.
C. Endnotes on the Practiceof Transfer Pricingfor Intangibles

It should be apparent to the reader by now that compliance with
the transfer pricing rules for intangibles is extremely burdensome,
more so even than other transfer pricing tasks. Twenty years ago, a
government's policy ("white") paper acknowledged that half of the
1272

transfer pricing cases at the time involved intangibles. Now, despite
the later revisions of the regulations, and the addition of the
commensurate with income requirement to section 482 - the single
statutory amendment that reflect the importance of this issue - the
portion of transfer pricing disputes involving intangibles only
increased since, and threatens to continue to do so. 273 Transfer pricing
270

The Court erred in imposing the requirement that assister status is dependent

upon a showing that expenditures related to the intangible were in excess of those
that a comparable licensee would expend. This is because the tax court applied the
1994 regulations, which provided for such a standard but the applicable regulations
that the tax court should have applied were the 1968 regulations which did not impose
such a burden. The court of appeals does go on to say in dicta that even if the 1994
regulations were in effect, the tax court would still be incorrect.
271 Tax Court on Remand, 11 Transfer Pricing Report 387, 09/04/2002.
2 See I.R.S. Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 466 n.52.
273 Together with cross-border provision of services that often go hand-in-hand
with the transfer of intangibles, this is clearly the most important and disputable
aspect of transfer pricing today. See, e.g., ERNST & YOUNG, 2007-2008 GLOBAL
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in general became the single most important issue faced by MNEs,
according to a recent study."
Yet, despite the importance of the issue, this article demonstrates
the very superficial attention taken by the regulations to intangibles
and the reasons for the difficulties of applying these rules to transfer
of intangibles. The review of the court cases above is a striking
exhibition of the uselessness of the rules and prescribed methods
themselves. Case after case, the courts simply resort to independent,
freestyle application of what they understand to be the arm's length
principle, regardless of traditional court procedures, and, more
importantly, regardless of the regulations. The courts do feel bound
by the arm's length principle, so even when they are frustrated with
the impossibility of its application in the mode required by the
regulations, they resort to their own interpretation of the standard
(not the regulations). Awkwardly, this approach can lead courts to
reject at times alternative valuation methodologies that the
regulations permit in the context of the fourth method, even if such
methodologies are conventional in the practice of valuation."' This
approach of the courts further limited the chance of the system
"getting it right," confining the analysis to the arm's length standard
rhetoric, notwithstanding its effectiveness, reliability or desirability.
The fault should not be laid at the steps of the courts, since they,
similarly to taxpayers in general, were provided with unworkable
rules."' Next, the conclusion of the article makes the argument that
part of the fault is in the choice of the arm's length standard, and

TRANSFER PRICING SURVEY, supra note 8, at 14.
274

Id. at 2.

275 For a classic example of this unfortunate development, see Nestle
Holdings v.

Commissioner, 152 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1998), in which the Second Circuit refused to
accept a valuation of a trademark based on the relief-from-royalty - a primary
income based method -, arguing that it does not adequately reflect the value of the
transferred intangible. See also supra Part III. It is easy to read between the lines that
the court meant to say that this method is not based on the arm's length principle and
therefore it felt uncomfortable with using it. Also interesting is the simple conclusion
of the court that the various valuation methodologies result in different valuations,
and therefore some of them may not be used - meaning to say that valuation that
does not reach the number that an arm's length based analysis would reach is
unacceptable. This opinion is even more amazing once we remember that it reversed
a holding by the professional tax court that accepted the use of the relief-from-royalty
method.
276 See, e.g., Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson,
ClearingAway the Sand:
Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today, 57
TAX L. REV. 37, 40 (2003).
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another part is in its rigid and rhetoric application.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF TRANSFER PRICING

This article analyzes our current transfer pricing regime as it
applies to transfers of intangible assets. This concluding section
evaluates the desirability of this regime in light of the analysis. It
begins with an extraction of the achievement of the current regime,
and a sober realization of its actual effects on our society. The
conclusions are then generalized to an assessment of the arm's length
principle. The transfer pricing analysis of transfers of intangibles is
probably the most significant challenge that or current arm's length
based regime faces, and therefore it is particularly important to
evaluate its effectiveness in this context. Finally, the current regime is
contrasted against a formula based transfer pricing regime in order to
highlight the benefits of such alternative regime in comparison to our
arm's length based regime with respect to the challenges that
intangibles pose to transfer pricing in general. We begin, however,
with what we learned about our current law in this article.
A. The Reality of Current Law
We learned in this article that despite the evolution in transfer
pricing rules, and the inclusion of special rules that apply specifically
to transfers of intangibles, such rules do not account for the unique
features of intangibles that make them a difficult challenge to any
transfer pricing regime.
The regulations provide four permissible methods, among which
one - CUT - the most direct application of the arm's length method is
practically irrelevant, and another is a basket residual - unspecified method. This leaves the taxpayer with two methods - CPM and profit
split - in terms of specific guidance. Nonetheless, even these methods
provide little specific guidance. They include almost no particular
reference to intangibles, and no reference at all to the unique features
of intangibles that make them difficult to price. Even in terms of
appearance, both of these methods were not rewritten into the
regulation that deals with transfers of intangibles... and continue to
apply to all cross-border transfers almost similarly. CPM and profit
split present also substantive difficulties. They are both essentially
277

Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4 (2006).

278 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 (2003) (covering CPM); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6 (2006)
(covering profit split).
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statistical methods that represent approximations rather then direct
valuation or pricing. They rely on normal, average market results and
not on particular transactions or assets. This, of course, represents a
deviation from the arm's length principle and its alleged objectivity
promise. It also ignores the particular uniqueness of intangibles and
transactions in intangibles that are typically less conforming to
market, industry, or sectoral norms. CPM and profits split, by design,
are not built for accuracy and capture of values generated by abovenormal profits. Both of these methods are based on the market
approach to valuation,"' yet, they both produce market ratios,
approximations, standards and norms - not market prices.
Related parties need additional mechanisms to come up with their
transfer prices, since eventually they are required to report a single
dollar amount (number) on their tax returns. No matter what nominal
method they use, specified or unspecified, taxpayers (and the courts,
as we have seen) are bound to make several judgment calls in the
process of coming up with the desirable number, some of which are
based on valuations of the intangibles involved in the reported
transactions. The claim of this article is that at each decision level the
law permits almost frictionless flexibility to taxpayers. This flexibility
is the combined and results in significant deviations from the desired
accurate result that our transfer pricing rules purport to target. Such
inaccuracy accumulates and creates a significant advantage to
taxpayers subject to transfer pricing analysis (MNEs), particularly if
they rely heavily on intangibles, in comparison to other taxpayers. 280
B. The Challenges Faced by the Arm's Length Principle
The most fundamental consequence of the current regime is that
MNEs are particularly advantaged in comparison to other enterprises,
and their advantage is more significant the more heavily they rely on
intangibles to generate profits. 281 Such taxpayers, but also (essentially)
all other business taxpayers, are advantaged vis-A-vis the Service in
this game. This is particularly true due to the rigidity of the
regulations and their conservative evolution. The Service must follow
the general path prescribed by the regulations, yet such path is not
only limiting, but also limited, which leads to multiple eventualities
279 These methods are often mixed with other approaches.
280

The advantage is above and beyond the costs of transfer pricing compliance.

See also sources cited supra note 121.
281 See also David R. Hardy, Assignment of Corporate Opportunities
- the
Migration of American Intangibles,730 PLI/Tax 645 (2006).
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when taxpayers are required to use unprescribed valuation
methodologies, including new, more sophisticated models that thrive
in today's market consequently.
The use of modern, more sophisticated valuation methodologies
could be desirable, yet the use of such methodologies is arbitrary from
the perspective of the system. In some cases taxpayers may use it, such
as when the prescribed methods do not produce a satisfactory result,
or when such methods call for secondary valuations that do not follow
prescribed methods (such as valuations of contributions of certain
intangibles to the process of development of the tested intangible). In
other cases, however, the taxpayer may not (not because the
prescribed methods produce better results, but because they produce
satisfactory enough results for them). The Service, of course, is even
in a more inferior position. Among the difficulties of using modern
methodologies are: (1) that they constantly develop; (2) they often
rely on a mix of valuation approaches, so the rhetoric of adherence to
the arm's length standard may prove to be more difficult to keep if
they were allowed; (3) they are numerous, so it would be more
difficult to administer and enforce from the government's perspective
- especially the best method rule would be impracticable - and also

since it is very difficult to include in the rigid regulatory system that
we have at the present; (4) many of the new methodologies are
proprietary and rely on proprietary databases that if allowed may
raise questions of fairness, equality etc. The main issue, however, is
that the prescribed methods are so weak that taxpayers are in practice
using some of the proprietary tools quite frequently, yet with no
regulatory ordered supervision.
Novel valuation methodologies and proprietary databases are not
the primary challenge that the arm's length standard faces. It is the
false adherence to this standard that does it, and ties the hands of the
Service in fighting this difficult battle. The transfer pricing methods
preferred by the Service, CPM and profit split, are both basically
statistical methods based on approximations and almost "thumb
rules." The manner in which the courts dealt with the relevant tax
cases demonstrates this most clearly. The system sends signals of
helplessness, attempting to fulfill its tasks to the best of their ability
without the support of coherent, practical set of rules. The fact that no
clear hierarchy between the methods is imposed, is the first indicator
to this lack of confidence in the arm's length standard. This
uncertainty was covered up by the "best method" requirement, yet no
realistic guidance was given, which left the choice, and therefore, also
the advantage, to the taxpayers. The system is designed so that
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taxpayers who take transfer pricing seriously have the advantage of
setting the rules of the game and the facts presented in the way they
want them to be presented. Now, surely MNEs will respond that this
is not correct and that they would be very happy to get rid of the rules
and the expenses involved, yet, this is not an option. The question is
only which of the alternatives regimes is superior. Moreover, in the
attempt to hold on to the arm's length "ideal," the arm's length range
concept was introduced into the rules. Again, this is a reasonable rule
if one accepts arm's length as the only possible principle guiding the
regime, since all agree that an accurate comparable price is impossible
to establish. But, it also proves the same thing: that this system cannot
deliver the promise of arm's length, and does not take advantage of
the potential advantages of the market approach to valuation. The
averaging solution of the arm's length range rule creates an embedded
inaccuracy and an advantage to taxpayers in this context. The
comparability requirement and guidance have a similar effect, because
the current regime does not account for levels of comparability or
"accuracy." Comparability analysis can result either in acceptance of
the suggested comparable or not, notwithstanding the degree of
deviation and the degree of in accuracy of alternative methods. This is
further explored in the next section.
In conclusion, the theoretical advantage of the arm's length
standard, based on a classical market approach to valuation, is lost in
practice. It remains merely rhetoric, replaced by workable piecemeal
mechanisms, and whose main quality is that the government views
them as noncontradictory of the arm's length rhetoric. Next, I add to
this critique that the arm's length is not only unworkable, but also
conceptually inferior to a formula based transfer pricing regime.
C. The Future of Transfer PricingIs in a Formula-BasedRegime
The inadequacy and inappropriateness of the arm's length
standard have been extensively explored in the last few decades. 12
See, e.g., Louis M. Kauder, Intercompany Pricing and Section 482: A Proposal
to Shift from Uncontrolled Comparables to FormularyApportionment Now, 58 TAX
NOTES 485 (Jan. 25, 1993); Stanley I. Langbein, The Unitary Method and the Myth of
Arm'sArm's Length, 30 TAX NOTES 625 (Feb. 17, 1986); Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary
Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone: A Policy Perspective, 49 TAX L.
REV 691 (1994); John Turro, The Battle Over Arm'sArm's Length and Formulary
Apportionment, 65 TAX NOTES 1595 (Dec. 26, 1994); see Ackerman & Chorvat, supra
note 166 (promoting expansion of profit split and its formulary apportionment
elements, together with modem financial models); Avi-Yonah, supra note 8; Hardy,
supra note 281; Walter Hellerstein, InternationalIncome Allocation in the Twenty-first
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The contribution of this article to the literature is to support this
criticism of the arm's length standard from the specific angle of the
treatment of intangibles, and to promote an alternative, formula based
transfer pricing regime. It argues not only that a formula based
transfer pricing regime is practically more desirable, but also that it is
theoretically superior to our current arm's length based regime.
First, however, the superiority of a formula based transfer pricing
regime over the current regime should be demonstrated. The key
difficulty that this arm's length based regime faces is the frequent
reliance on comparability and valuation, which often results in high
level of compounded inaccuracy. This inaccuracy is inevitable under
an arm's length based regime, because by definition such a regime
does not account for the fundamental difference between related and
unrelated transactions and creates a (necessarily false) fiction that
such transactions are interchangeable. The inescapable, heavy reliance
on valuations that are, again, by definition estimations and
approximations, contributes to the inaccuracy. Finally, our current
system does not seriously account for the degree of incomparability
between the tested transactions and the "comparables,"'2 3 which adds
to the inaccuracy further. One may argue that this is just a defect of
the current system and could be amended. This is true, yet, a
correction, if done coherently with the current system, would require
an additional level of valuation and maybe comparables to asses the
degree of incomparability. Such a correction may make the system
more coherent, yet, it won't necessarily correct its inaccuracy since it
relies on the same estimations, etc. I think that this picture is clear by
now.
One may ask what is the problem with this inaccuracy. It is
obvious that these are not market transactions, so standard and
acceptable valuations methodologies, which are the best
approximations, are made - this is the best that we can do with such
transactions. My disagreement with this contention is threefold. First,
our transfer pricing regime does not permit the use of all available
valuation methodologies, and, in reality, it is only when the rules are
not specific about the valuation itself that taxpayers are able to use
Century: The Case for Formulary Apportionment, 12 INT'L TRANSFER PRICING J. 103
(2005).
2S3 It only tests a comparable for such degree of comparability. The
result of this
testing is essentially all or nothing. Either the comparability is sufficient, and then it is
accepted as is, with no or little adjustment, or the comparability is insufficient and
then the comparable cannot be used. No adjustments are allowed if the latter
conclusion is made, notwithstanding whether other comparables are available or not.
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methodologies that may be more creative and sophisticated. Yet, even
that would not revive the current regime because valuation and
measurement are not designed to come up with a specific number. It
is rather normally designed to reduce uncertainty in order to improve
business decisions that depend inter alia on the value of the tested
assets or businesses. Conversely, in the context of transfer pricing, no
market decisions are at stake but rather a one-dimensional regulation
that attempts to come out with a single, accurate dollar amount, like
all other dollar amounts that find their ways to our tax returns.
However, this is impossible, an arm's length proponent will respond.
It is not impossible, just misguided. There is no need to come up with
transfer prices that look like market prices, and alternative regimes,
such as formulary apportionment should be explored. This however, is
my third point; the second is to explain what is bad about the
inaccuracy of our transfer pricing regime.
The primary problem with the significant inaccuracy of the
current regime is that it creates a huge advantage to MNEs in
comparison to all other taxpayers. This advantage is not even equal
for all MNEs but, as demonstrated in this article, grows in power the
more heavily reliant on intangibles the MNEs are. These MNEs do
pay a price in the form of compliance costs, yet these compliance costs
are minimal in comparison to the advantage they get, so the playing
field is not level, and at the same time such costs are simply wasteful
as they do not represent any substantive goal - they just require
investment of funds from taxpayers. In fact the current rules gave rise
to the (wasteful) industry of transfer pricing compliance/valuation
specialists. Note that the various levels of inaccuracy do not cancel
each other on the average. This is because such inaccuracies are not
just a result of margins of error, they are inherent in the process, and
taxpayers control the product of the process. They are allowed, and
have all the reason in the world, to be as close as possible to the
boundaries of the range of acceptable results in each stage of the
analysis. They will always chose the extreme that is the most
beneficial to them, and each time they make such a choice, the level of
inaccuracy works in their favor and compounds with prior and future
levels of inaccuracies exploited in the process of establishing the
transfer price. The system does not and will not compensate for these
deviations because it does not recognize it. The bias in favor of MNEs
may seem desirable to some, yet naturally achieving it in these means
is extremely wasteful, imprecise and does not depend on any

'8

See supra note 74.
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identified social benefit that the taxpayer delivers. Moreover, the
benefit that the United States grants to its MNEs does not necessarily
correspond to the regulation and tax systems of other countries.
Double taxation or no taxation are still possible and are not dealt with
by this regime.
This is a problem, since at the end of the day transfer pricing is
simply part of our tax accounting regime, or the rules that measure the
income at stake in the process of analysis and assessment of income
tax due. It is an international tax rule in that its function is merely to
divide income between two (or more) countries that may have a claim
to that income. The income division function of our international tax
rules rely on certain fundamental principles that are essentially
universally accepted. One is the single tax principle, i.e., that income
should be taxed once, but preferably not more than once, by some
country (or a combination of countries). Another is the principle that
the primary right to tax active or business income is vested to the
source country - the country where the activity takes place, while the
primary right to take passive activity is with the residence country (the
residence of the investor). The single tax principle is important here
because it is apparent that it would be very difficult to achieve in the
world of the arm's length principle. Countries could cooperate and
accept universal norms in theory, so that we could ignore the current
(noncooperative) state of the international tax regime, and even the
fact that multilateral approach to transfer pricing is basically
nonexistent - transfer pricing establishment is largely a domestic
unilateral process in practice. We cannot ignore, however, the nature
of the application of the arm's length standard. Especially in the
context of intangibles, it is expected that different countries will take
different positions about comparability, reliability, adjustments, etc.
Indeed, the details of the transfer pricing process and particularly
valuations of intangibles vary significantly between countries. Even
the permissible methods are not universal these days. We ignore, for
simplicity, the effects of tax competition between countries in this
context.
Global imbalance in this context is not inevitable. A formula
based regime is based on the actual function of transfer pricing and
not on a fiction of analogy to transactions that are completely
irrelevant to this function. A formula-based regime simply divides
income between the countries involved based on certain agreed
principles and without the pretension of economic justification to the
division principles. This division is naturally arbitrary at large because
the division of income between two jurisdictions is arbitrary - it was
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earned once, by one firm, independent of the political division,
whatever it is. This is exactly what our international tax regime does the division of income between countries is based on certain rough
principles and particular compromises that are the fruits of
negotiation, not economic principles. An important factor in such
negotiations is the universal acceptance of some rough norms that
countries accept because they believe these norms and more
importantly a degree of convergence are beneficial to them in the end
even if in the specific negotiations they may have achieved a better
result without such universal norms.
It is very realistic to believe that countries will agree on a formula,
based on which a new transfer pricing regime will be based, yet it is
not realistic that countries will negotiate and agree on very detailed
and fact specific protocols of valuations for intangibles. This article
obviously argues that it is also unnecessary.
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the design of this
formula based regime, yet one point is a natural consequence of the
analysis above: the formula should focus on an accepted norm for
division of income between countries that imitates the general norms
we have. It should not be based on mechanisms that we think are
appropriate just because we have experience with them if they do not
fit the already existing international consensus. For example, there is
no reason to imitate the formulae used by the U.S. states for their
income • tax285 systems that are usually based on assets, sales, and
employees. The new emphasis, advocated by this article, is on the
requirement that the formula-based transfer pricing reform conform
to the basic premises of our general international tax regime, since it
provides a distinct advantage to a formula-based transfer pricing
286
regime over the current arm's length based rules. Otherwise, these
85

Any reliance on assets, for instance, will invite the issue of valuations again in

order to estimate the value of the intangible assets. Nonetheless, I think that is not a
serious concern because in this case it is a single valuation that is not compounded
with other estimations; it is itself the product rather than a tool to get to something
else and it will be easier to coordinate acceptable means of valuation between the
countries involved. Of course, if it proves to be problematic, it could be avoided by
dropping assets (or even just certain intangibles) from the formula, which is
impossible under our current regime.
286 A formula-based reform also better captures the multilateral dimension
of
transfer pricing, which is currently ignored by our essentially unilateral arm's length
based regime. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah advocated a similar approach, although
in a somewhat different context and reaching different conclusions. See Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, The Structure of InternationalTaxation: A Proposalfor Simplification, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996).
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two regimes cannot be viewed so much as alternatives but as points on
287

a continuum of solutions to the transfer pricing challenge .

See Avi-Yonah, supra note 8; see also Charles McLure, Jr., US. FederalUse of
Formula Apportionment to Tax Income From Intangibles, 97 TNI 47-26 (Mar. 11,
1997).
27

